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Reliance in Land Use Law
Kenneth A. Stahl *
ABSTRACT

For generations, Americans have tapped their life savings and assumed
huge amounts of debt in order to achieve the American dream of owning their
own home. Though investing so heavily in a single asset is a rather risky move
on its face, buyers have been induced to purchase homes by a slew of public
policies, most notably zoning ordinances that buffer single-family
neighborhoods against an invasion of unwanted uses. As a result, homeowners
have a fairly convincing argument that they possess some sort of vested reliance
interest in the existing zoning of their neighborhoods that should prevent
municipal authorities from enacting unwanted zoning changes.
Courts, however, have not been receptive to homeowners’ pleas when such
zoning changes are threatened. While courts will frequently safeguard the
reliance interests of landowners who have undertaken substantial expenditures
to develop their property, they offer no such protection for the reliance interests
of landowners who desire to prevent development on neighboring property. I
argue that the distinction between developers’ and neighbors’ reliance interests
rests on judicial intuitions about the nature of the local political process: courts
suspect that homeowners are likely to be the dominant faction in most
municipalities and can therefore prevent unwanted development through their
influence with city hall, whereas developers are unlikely to be powerful in a
local political process dominated by antidevelopment homeowners, especially
once a developer has made substantial expenditures on a particular project.
This conclusion leads to a broader insight: judicial review of land use decision
making is largely driven by a desire to protect the reliance interests of both
developers and homeowners. Thus, courts are generally deferential toward most
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Environmental, Land Use, and Real
Estate Law Program, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. J.D., Yale University;
B.A., University of Michigan. My thanks to Deepa Badrinarayana, Jonathan Glater, Al Lin, David
Min, Richard Norton, Timothy Mulvaney, David Schleicher, Betty Stahl, Shauhin Talesh, and
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municipal land use policies that privilege homeowners’ reliance interests but
occasionally temper that deference with solicitude for developers.
The courts’ fetishization of reliance interests has come at a substantial
price, however. For the sake of protecting reliance interests in existing zoning
schemes, courts have essentially reified a longstanding pattern of de facto
income and racial segregation in most metropolitan regions by licensing
suburban communities to maintain zoning barriers that enforce such
segregation. Moreover, I conclude that the judicial enterprise to protect reliance
interests by empowering local governments is entirely self-defeating because, as
the recent real estate downturn vividly illustrates, property values are
determined by a complex web of forces well beyond the control of local
governments.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent survey by the real estate valuation website Zillow
reveals that, although home prices have sharply declined since the
economic crash of 2008, home sellers routinely overstate the value of
their homes by 10% or more. 1 Another survey, by the consulting
group The Saint Index, measured attitudes toward real estate
development and found that homeowners are more hostile to new
development now than they have ever been in the six-year history of
the survey. 2 The Saint Index survey further concluded that concern
about the impact of new development on home values was a
significant factor in explaining this hostility. 3 Taken together, these
two studies demonstrate that homeowners are grimly determined to
cling to a state of affairs that has since been wiped out by the
economic calamity. They can hardly be faulted for their
stubbornness. Millions of Americans have invested all or virtually all
of their savings in the family home. 4 To finance the purchase of that
1. See Sellers Who Bought Post-Bubble Guilty of Overpricing Homes, ZILLOW.COM (July 14,
2011), http://zillow.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=159&item=231. For further commentary,
see Kenneth R. Harney, Bridging the Great Divide Between Home Buyers and Sellers, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
1, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-harney-20120101,0,6342117.story.
2. See The Saint Consulting Group, General Attitudes, THE SAINT INDEX,
http://saintindex.info/general-attitudes#nimbyattitudes (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
3. See
The
Saint
Consulting
Group,
Activism,
THE
SAINT
INDEX,
http://saintindex.info/activism (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). According to the survey authors,
while only 14% of respondents answered that protecting the value of their homes was the
principal reason for their opposition to new development, six years of survey results
demonstrates that protecting home values plays a much larger role in opposition to
development. See id.
4. See William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146 (2001)
[hereinafter Fischel, NIMBYs] (reporting that a vast majority of households have all of their
savings in their homes).
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home, most buyers have assumed an indebtedness so substantial
that they can expect to spend nearly the rest of their lives paying it
back. 5 A major decline in the value of one’s home can wipe out the
homeowner’s savings and jeopardize her ability to obtain further
credit, while leaving the underlying debt firmly intact. 6
Homeowners thus have a very good reason to hope that their
property values will not decline after the initial purchase. But
millions of Americans have not invested their savings and
creditworthiness in a single asset of uncertain value by simply
crossing their fingers and hoping for the best. Rather, it has been a
principal aim of government housing policy for nearly the past
century to encourage home purchases by assuring buyers that the
value of their homes will be maintained. Policies such as cheap lowinterest mortgages, generous tax deductions, and municipal zoning
ordinances have all been designed to induce Americans to buy
homes by giving them the confidence that their investments will not
decline in value.7 After being plied with such assurances, it is
understandable that homeowners would not be keen on seeing their
property values plummet. Needless to say, homeowners become
especially infuriated when the very government policies upon which
they have relied in choosing to purchase their homes are changed in
such a way that threatens to cause a decline in property values. As
countless anecdotes reveal, homeowners who have purchased homes
in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for single-family homes will
revolt at the prospect of municipal authorities changing the
neighborhood’s zoning classification to permit a new development
such as a shopping mall or a multi-family housing complex. 8 Having
purchased in reliance on the pre-existing zoning classification,

5. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1 (5th ed.
2007) (describing a typical 30-year, fully amortizing mortgage).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 32–33 (describing consequences of decline in
property values).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 35–49 (describing government housing policies).
8. For discussions of various episodes in which homeowners (often dubbed “NIMBYs”)
have fought tooth and nail against proposed new development, see, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF
QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 153–219 (1990); RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL
OF PUBLIC MAN 301–08 (1977) (discussing a variety of tactics used by the neighborhood of Forest
Hills, Queens, to prevent siting of low-income housing project); Michael Dear, Understanding and
Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 288, 290–91 (1992) (describing
strategies used by development opponents to prevent unwanted growth).
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homeowners often believe they have a vested right to maintain that
classification in perpetuity. 9 As with most things, this belief
frequently ends up the subject of litigation.
The courts have indeed been hospitable venues for claims that a
particular landowner has a cognizable reliance interest in a
regulatory status quo. Since the 1920s, the courts have used numerous
doctrines, such as nonconforming use, vested rights, zoning
estoppel, and the “distinct investment-backed expectations” prong of
the regulatory takings inquiry, to protect landowners in
circumstances where they have been induced to make expenditures
in the good-faith belief that the existing regulatory state of affairs
would remain in place. 10 These doctrines, however, have proven to
be of little help to homeowners aggrieved by land use changes.
Courts will typically only protect a landowner’s reliance interests
when he or she has done something more than finance a purchase of
real estate under an existing regulatory regime, such as making
costly improvements to the property. In short, the courts are more
concerned about protecting the reliance interests of developers of real
property than the reliance interests of neighboring landowners who
wish merely to prevent the development of nearby property. 11 The
courts typically rationalize their solicitude for developers on two
grounds: 1) fairness to those who have made expenditures in good
faith reliance on the status quo and 2) the desire to incentivize
investment in real property. As I explain further below, however,

9. See Ken Baar, Facts and Fallacies in the Rental Housing Market, W. CITY, Sept. 1986, at
57 (“One of the most cherished property rights in our ‘free enterprise system’ is not the right to
do what one pleases with one’s property, but the right to live in a neighborhood in which no
more multi-family housing may be constructed.”).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 15–17 (summarizing extant doctrine).
11. The tension between landowners who wish to develop their property and landowners
who would prevent development on neighboring property has been the subject of an extensive
literature. Fischel, for example, details the dynamic between “land at risk” and “land at rest.” See
Fischel, NIMBYS, supra note 4, at 253, 278–80 (citing JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 24 (1956)). Others refer
to a conflict between “use” and “exchange” value. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L.
MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 31–49 (1987) (describing
conflict between those who desire to maximize exchange value and those who desire to
maximize use value, and how it is manifested in political terms in urban governance); MANUEL
CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS 319 (1983).
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both of these justifications would likewise favor the judicial
protection of homeowners’ reliance interests. 12
This Article develops a model for explaining why courts treat
developers’ reliance interests so much more favorably than those of
homeowners, notwithstanding the fact that homeowners seem to
have a strong case for judicial protection of their reliance interests.
Drawing on public choice scholarship—which urges that judicial
doctrine should be sensitive to the nature of the political process by
which legislation is enacted 13—I argue that the principal reason
courts decline to provide protection for homeowners’ reliance
interests is because they suspect, correctly, that homeowners have
sufficient political influence with the regulatory authorities that
make most land use decisions to protect their own reliance interests
through the political process without judicial intervention (by, for
example, pressuring the local city council to enact and maintain
zoning ordinances that restrict unwanted new development). Thus,
contrary to initial appearances, courts are not indifferent to
homeowners’ reliance interests; they simply believe that those
interests are more appropriately vindicated within the political than
the judicial sphere. In fact, as I demonstrate, courts have taken
affirmative steps to ensure that homeowners have the ability to
protect their own reliance interests through the political process,
such as deferring broadly to municipal land use ordinances designed
to protect homeowners’ existing property values and endorsing the
proliferation of small suburban municipalities in which homeowners
can reliably exercise political control.
By the same token, however, because the local political process
tends to advantage antidevelopment homeowners, courts intuit that
developers are systematically underrepresented in that process.
Thus, judicial protection is necessary to protect developers in
circumstances where they are likely to be exploited by a hostile local
majority. According to public choice theory, developers can typically
avoid such exploitation by simply exiting the jurisdiction and
seeking a friendlier regulatory environment elsewhere. Once a

12. See infra text accompanying notes 50–53.
13. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 12–37,
116–43 (1991); MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 42–92 (2009).
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developer makes a substantial investment in a particular project,
however, the cost of exit rises dramatically and renders the developer
vulnerable to majoritarian exploitation. For this reason, judicial
intervention into the political process is appropriate where a
developer has presented evidence of significant reliance interests.
This public choice model thus yields an important insight:
judicial review of land use decision making is largely driven by the
desire to protect reliance interests—both those of developers and
homeowners. This solicitude for reliance interests equally explains
why courts are generally deferential toward most municipal land use
policies that favor homeowners and why they occasionally temper
that deference in order to protect developers’ reliance interests.
Previous public choice scholarship on land use decision making has
not trained its focus on the importance of reliance, and some
scholars have affirmatively dismissed the significance of reliance. 14
This paper argues, though, that reliance belongs at the heart of the
public choice model of judicial review.
Recognizing the primacy of reliance is important because it
enables a robust normative critique of the judicial approach to
municipal land use decision making. For the sake of protecting
reliance interests in existing zoning schemes, courts have essentially
14. Saul Levmore argues that public choice theory can explain the Supreme Court’s
regulatory takings doctrine insofar as that doctrine extends protection to smaller, isolated
groups that are incapable of organizing to influence government, but typically denies protection
to larger, well-organized groups. See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN.
L. REV. 285, 320 (1990). Levmore explicitly rejects the idea that the Court’s takings
jurisprudence centers on the protection of reliance interests. See id. at 317–18 n.74. I respond to
Levmore’s argument infra at text accompanying notes 86–89, 159–80.
In a pair of books, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS] and REGULATORY TAKINGS (1995) [hereinafter FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS],
William Fischel has argued that homeowners control the local political process, that developers
are therefore vulnerable to exploitation by that process, and that courts should accordingly
intervene to protect developers from majoritarian exploitation. While noting the role that risk
plays in the homeowner’s motivation to be politically active, Fischel does not draw attention to
the significance of reliance interests in establishing the relative political influence of
homeowners vis-à-vis developers, or the ways in which the courts have sought to protect the
reliance interests of both homeowners and developers.
Finally, Joseph William Singer’s landmark article, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 611 (1988), argues that the law of property does in fact, and should as a normative
matter, recognize that non-owners of property often have vested reliance interests in the use of
real property owned by others. Singer’s article spends little time discussing land use regulation,
or how public choice theory specifically can justify robust protection for reliance interests.
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reified a longstanding pattern of income and racial segregation in
most metropolitan regions by licensing suburban communities to
maintain zoning barriers that enforce such segregation. Courts have
been clear that the protection of reliance interests is a perfectly
sensible justification for discriminating in favor of existing residents
and against prospective residents. The courts dismiss concerns about
interlocal segregation by simply insisting that a municipality’s land
use policies have no impacts beyond its borders.
This last point is revealing because it demonstrates the very
flimsy footing on which the entire reliance model of judicial review
rests. The model presupposes that homeowners can protect their
own reliance interests through their influence over local government,
and therefore assumes that those reliance interests will not be
adversely affected by actions taking place outside the municipality
(over which homeowners would have no control). In truth, however,
property values are determined by a complex web of forces well
beyond the control of isolated local governments, as the recent real
estate crash forcefully demonstrates. I conclude, therefore, that
municipalities’ charge to protect homeowners’ reliance interests is a
self-defeating enterprise, and unworthy of the judicial deference it
has been granted.
Part I sets out the basic problem: courts appear to favor
developers’ reliance interests and disfavor homeowners’ reliance
interests, although homeowners have a strong case that their
reliance interests are deserving of judicial protection. Part II
considers and dismisses some superficially appealing explanations
for this distinction. Part III sets out the basic public choice model of
reliance and shows how that model can explain both judicial
deference to land use policies that favor homeowners and judicial
intervention to protect developers’ reliance interests. Part IV then
articulates a descriptive and normative critique of the model.
I. WHOSE RELIANCE INTERESTS COUNT?
This Part illustrates an apparent inconsistency in land use law:
courts provide protection for the reliance interests of landowners
who wish to develop their property, at least in some circumstances,
but no such protection for the reliance interests of landowners who
wish to prevent development on neighboring property. Section A sets
out the basic law governing the judicial protection of reliance
interests in land use law and explains how it distinguishes
956
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developers from neighbors. Section B then argues that this
distinction is, on the surface, indefensible: neighbors have at least as
strong an argument for judicial recognition of their reliance interests
as developers do. In the subsequent Parts, I will articulate a model of
judicial review that explains why courts extend judicial protection for
developers’ reliance interests while denying it to neighbors.

A. Judicial Protection for Reliance Interests in Land Use Law
As is true in many other areas of the law, one persistent theme
in land use law is the desire to vindicate the expectations of those
who have taken substantial actions to their detriment in reasonable
reliance on the status quo. Courts have fashioned a number of
common-law doctrines designed to protect landowners who have
reasonably relied on an existing scheme of land use regulations
against an adverse change in that regulatory scheme. For instance, if
a landowner has been using her property in a manner consistent
with existing zoning regulations and the zoning is then changed to
make that use of land unlawful, the landowner may be entitled to
continue using the land as she did prior to the zoning change under
the doctrine of “nonconforming use.” 15 Likewise, if a landowner has
made substantial expenditures on an inchoate development project
under a regulatory regime, the developer may acquire “vested rights”
that prevent the regulatory authority from changing its regulations in
a manner that interferes with the developer’s expectations. 16 Finally,
the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine provides that one
touchstone for determining whether a landowner’s property has
been “taken” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is the
extent to which regulation upsets a landowner’s “distinct

15. See, e.g., JAMES C. SMITH & JACQUELINE P. HAND, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 8:8
(2011) (describing nonconforming use doctrine). In most states, nonconforming uses can be
amortized after a reasonable period of time. See DANIEL P. SELMI ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION
67–69 (3d ed. 2008) (collecting cases). In a minority of states, however, amortization is per se
unconstitutional. See id. (collecting cases).
16. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. ZIZKA ET AL., STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE LIABILITY
§ 2:11 (2011) (describing vested rights doctrine). A related doctrine to vested rights is “zoning
estoppel.” Zoning estoppel generally refers to a situation where a developer makes substantial
investments in reliance on a representation by a government official. See SELMI ET AL., supra note
15, at 135 (collecting cases finding estoppel).
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investment-backed expectations,” that is, the landowner’s reasonable
reliance on a pre-existing state of affairs. 17
Although courts have done a poor job articulating precisely why
reliance interests deserve judicial protection, it appears that the
respect accorded to reliance interests is rooted in considerations of
both equity and efficiency. First, courts seem to think it fundamentally
unfair that a landowner should expend significant resources on an
investment in the good faith belief that the status quo would remain
unchanged, only to endure a complete wipeout of that investment
when an unpredictable change occurs. 18 Second, protecting reliance
interests encourages landowners to invest resources in real property
by giving them some assurance that they will have the eventual
opportunity to harvest the fruits of their labor. 19 If the law provided
no protection for reliance interests, landowners would be hesitant to
invest in real property out of fear that their investment could be
rendered worthless at the whim of a municipal zoning authority.
Courts, however, only offer protection to reliance interests in
limited circumstances, perhaps out of deference to regulatory

17. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). In
practice, the “distinct investment-backed expectations” test has proven to be more of a shield for
government than protection for landowners because its “positivist” conception of property rights
enables regulatory authorities to themselves determine the extent of the developer’s reasonable
expectations. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Fall of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32
URB. LAW. 437 (2000). On the other hand, the Court did invoke the idea of investment-backed
expectations in finding a regulatory taking in one of its more significant recent cases. See Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.7, 1019 n.8 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993)
(arguing that the “expectations” prong of Penn Central was key to the result in Lucas). I discuss
Lucas further infra at text accompanying notes 54–75.
18. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 635 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that “distinct investment backed expectations” prong of regulatory takings test is
rooted in fairness concerns); City of Goleta v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara Cnty., 147 P.3d
1037 (Cal. 2006) (doctrine of equitable estoppel is “founded on concepts of equity and fair
dealing”) (citation omitted); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use
Regulation, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1266–67 (2009) (discussing fairness rationale).
19. W. Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 395 (Utah 1980) (recognizing
vested rights and noting “[t]he economic waste that occurs when a project is halted after
substantial costs have been incurred in its commencement”); Serkin, supra note 18, at 1270–71
(discussing efficiency concerns); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269,
269 (1988) (“In a world lacking any compensation requirement, the obvious fear is that private
investors will be inhibited by the thought that government will snatch . . . the fruits of their
venture.”).
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authorities’ need for flexibility in adapting land use regulations to
changing circumstances. 20 Thus, courts will generally recognize
vested rights only where a landowner has made substantial
improvements to the property 21 based on some very particularized
regulatory activity, such as an application for a building permit or a
site-specific rezoning. 22 Merely financing a purchase of real property
under an existing zoning classification is generally insufficient. 23
In practice, these requirements favor landowners who have taken
steps to develop their property and disfavor those landowners who
desire to prevent development on neighboring property. 24 I illustrate
20. See, e.g., Avco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 54
(Cal. 1976) (rejecting claim that developer acquired vested rights after obtaining final
discretionary approval because recognizing vested rights would impair “government’s right to
control land use policy” by “freez[ing] the zoning laws applicable to a subdivision or a planned
unit development as of the time these events occurred”).
21. Many courts require some evidence of construction and do not recognize preconstruction activities as sufficient. See, e.g., DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d
124 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring substantial construction and substantial expenditures); W. Land
Equities, 617 P.2d at 392 (noting that most courts typically require “some physical construction”
and will not consider “[p]reconstruction activities such as the execution of architectural
drawings or the clearing of land and widening of roads”); J. David Breemer, Playing the

Expectations Game: When Are Investment-Backed Land Use Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State
Courts?, 38 URB. LAW. 81, 98–101 (2006) (describing “get a shovel in the ground” rule used by
many state courts to evaluate whether a landowner has reasonable investment-backed
expectations under regulatory takings inquiry).
22. Many states require the issuance of a permit in order for rights to vest. See Avco, 553
P.2d at 553 (stating that vested rights require substantial expenditures in reliance on a
government permit). Avco represents the strictest approach to vested rights. Other courts
require only the submission of an application for development approval. See W. Land Equities,
617 P.2d at 388 (holding developer established vested rights upon submitting application for
subdivision approval, despite failure to move beyond stage of pre-construction planning). Still
others will base vested rights on a site-specific rezoning. See City of Suffolk ex rel. Herbert v. Bd.
of Zoning Appeals, 580 S.E.2d 796 (Va. 2003), rev’d by statute on other grounds (stating that vested
rights accrued based on earlier rezoning, absent permit or application). For a comprehensive
discussion of the various approaches, see ZIZKA ET AL., supra note 16, at § 2:11.
23. See, e.g., Belvidere Twp. v. Heinze, 615 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating
that purchase and acquisition of financing, coupled with numerous other preparatory acts,
deemed insufficient to establish vested rights).
24. This is not to say that developers are necessarily pleased with the amount of
protection the extant doctrine affords them. The requirements for establishing vested rights are
daunting for any developer to satisfy, and some commentators have concluded that the commonlaw vested rights regime provides far too little protection for developers. See Donald G. Hagman,
Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, 11 SW. U. L. REV. 545 (1979). As a result
of pressure from developers, many states have enacted statutes providing additional protections
for vested rights beyond those granted by the courts. See STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M.
PENALVER, LAND USE REGULATION 157 (2011) (at least eighteen states have enacted vested rights
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this problem with two examples. First, assume a developer desires to
construct a commercial development on a parcel of land. She spends
a total of $500,000 to acquire the parcel of land, obtain a rezoning of
the land from single-family residential to commercial (so that
commercial uses are now permitted), and begin construction of the
development. This developer could, depending on the state, obtain
vested rights that would prevent the municipality from changing the
zoning so as to prevent commercial development. Now consider the
second, converse scenario. An individual purchases a home for the
same $500,000 in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for single-family
homes, financed with a hefty mortgage. If the municipality
subsequently changes the neighborhood’s zoning classification to
permit commercial uses, the homeowner would have no vested
rights—in any state—that could block the land use change, even if
the homeowner could plausibly claim that she relied upon the preexisting zoning classification in choosing to purchase her home in
this neighborhood. The law distinguishes between the developer and
the homeowner because 1) the developer has undertaken substantial
improvements based on the pre-existing regulatory state of affairs
whereas the homeowner has not (her claim is simply that she
purchased her property and obtained financing in reliance on the
pre-existing zoning); and 2) the developer obtained some sitespecific regulatory assurance (a rezoning of the parcel) whereas the
homeowner did not (she seeks to maintain the zoning classification
not only on her own property, but on an entire neighborhood).
Hence, several courts have specifically held that neighbors have no
“eternally vested rights” in the perpetuation of an existing zoning
classification. 25
statutes). On the other hand, it is fair to question why courts should recognize developers’
vested rights at all. Protecting vested rights may overly constrain a municipality’s ability to
change its land use regulations in response to changed circumstances, and may also encourage
inefficient investment in land by developers for the sake of obtaining vested rights. See Serkin,
supra note 18, at 1283–87. I explore further infra at text accompanying notes 71–73 the reasons
why courts have not provided more robust protection for developers’ vested rights.
25. See Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1951); see also, e.g., Grund
v. Jefferson Cnty., 277 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1973); Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 603 P.2d 130, 133
(Colo. 1979) (stating that neighbors have no “vested right, per se, in the maintenance of a
particular zoning classification”); McGee v. City of Cocoa, 168 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) (“[V]ested rights in a particular zoning ordinance do not accrue to neighboring
owners”); Norbeck Vill. Joint Venture v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 254 A.2d 700 (Md. 1969);
Navin v. Town of Exeter, 339 A.2d 12 (N.H. 1975); Gray v. Trs., Monclova Twp., 313 N.E.2d
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At first blush, it makes sense that the law does not protect
neighbors’ reliance interests. It seems ludicrous to think that a
landowner could have vested rights in how a neighboring landowner
uses her own property. If we look closely at the homeowner’s
reliance claim, however, we will see that the matter is far more
complex. In fact, there is a strong argument that, judged by either
the criterion of fairness or efficiency, homeowners often have
reliance interests in existing zoning classifications that are just as
compelling, if not more so, than the reliance interests of those
developers to whom the law offers its protection.

366 (Ohio 1974); Buhler v. Racine Cnty., 146 N.W.2d 403, 408 (Wis. 1966).
Illinois appears to be the lone state that will, in certain circumstances, recognize
neighbors’ vested rights in a zoning scheme. See Cosmopolitan Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. City of Chi.,
190 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. 1963) (“[I]t is a well-established principle that one who buys land has
a right to rely upon the classification which existed at the time the purchase was made . . . .”).
As Fred Bosselman details in a fascinating article, Illinois’s land use jurisprudence, which
emerged from a desire to stabilize property values and encourage investment in real estate
during Chicago’s chaotic development of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
features some unique protections for neighbors. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of
“Nature’s Metropolis”: The Historical Context of Illinois’ Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
527 (1991).
To say that neighbors have no common-law right, outside of Illinois, to maintain an
existing zoning classification is not to say they have no legal recourse in the event of an
undesired zoning change. Neighbors may, for example, be able to bring suit against a
municipality for “spot zoning” when the municipality zones a small area of land in a way that is
inconsistent with the zoning of the surrounding area. See SELMI ET AL., supra note 15, at 69–76
(discussing spot zoning). There are several inadequacies with a spot zoning lawsuit, however,
including: 1) Many states limit standing to bring such suits to individuals who have suffered
“special damages” beyond the damage suffered generally by other members of the public; 2) the
spot zoning inquiry is very vague, depending on whether a court thinks the area rezoned is
sufficiently small to warrant invalidation; 3) spot zoning challenges can easily be circumvented
by simply rezoning a larger swath of land; 4) many courts will uphold spot zoning so long as it is
otherwise reasonable; and 5) collective action problems will often prevent neighbors from
bringing suit to challenge spot zoning. For a discussion of some of these shortcomings, see id.
In some states, such as California, neighbors can also attempt to stymy unwanted
development by bringing suit under statutes requiring developers to prepare detailed
environmental impact reports explaining the potential impacts of a project and exploring
alternatives. My goal here, though, is to understand why the judiciary distinguishes developers’
and homeowners’ reliance interests, so I have focused on common-law rights that landowners
may have to attack zoning changes, not statutory rights.
Incidentally, neither the spot zoning doctrine nor environmental impact reporting statutes
provides a cause of action based solely on a plaintiff’s reliance interests or diminution in
property values. These factors may give neighbors standing to sue, but do not entitle them to
relief on the merits unless they can prove that some independent harm has been done.
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B. The Neighbor’s Case
1. Capitalization and reliance interests
Let us return to our hypothetical purchaser of the $500,000
home in a neighborhood zoned for single-family homes. What
exactly is this individual buying for $500,000? The answer may seem
obvious: a house. In reality, however, she is purchasing a good deal
more than just a house for $500,000. The purchase of a home comes
bundled with numerous other amenities, such as the local public
schools, the property tax burden, and the character of the
surrounding neighborhood. Economic studies demonstrate that
these amenities are “capitalized” into home values—high-quality
local schools, low property taxes, or a preponderance of neighbors
who are homeowners rather than renters have been shown to
significantly increase home values, for example. 26 Perhaps the most
important amenity that is capitalized into home values, however, is
the neighborhood’s zoning classification. 27 In essence, zoning
provides an assurance that all of the parcels in a neighborhood will
remain restricted to single-family usage, and the home buyer pays a
premium for this assurance. Without the zoning, which is to say
without this assurance against adverse change, our $500,000 home
would undoubtedly be valued at far less.
The reason the homeowner values this assurance so highly is
because, absent zoning, a home purchase is a risky investment. Since
few individuals can finance a $500,000 purchase with cash on hand,
the homeowner will most likely pay a down payment of 10% of the
purchase price (here, $50,000) and finance the rest with a mortgage,
which is simply a loan that is secured by the home purchaser’s
interest in the property. 28 For most purchasers, a down payment of
26. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 45–46 (describing studies
detailing the extent of capitalization phenomenon). According to Fischel, impacts such as traffic
congestion, high crime rates, large public housing projects, and localized air pollution have been
shown to decrease property values for nearby property owners, while growth controls, highquality local schools, and having homeowners rather than renters as neighbors have
demonstrably increased property values. See id.
27. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 218–52 (using case study of
growth controls in California to demonstrate that land use regulations are capitalized into land
values).
28. For a depiction of the real estate financing process, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 5, § 1.1.

962

DO NOT DELETE

949

1/27/2014 10:26 AM

Reliance in Land Use Law

$50,000 alone would be sufficient to require a substantial share of
one’s life savings. This now becomes the homeowner’s “equity” in
the property. 29 After making the initial down payment to the seller,
the homeowner will typically be required to make a substantial
payment of principal and interest on the mortgage to the lender
every month for a period of up to thirty years. 30 Any payments on
the principal are added to the homeowner’s equity. In addition to the
mortgage, the homeowner must also pay regular property taxes, and
may also pay homeowners’ association dues or other types of special
taxes or assessments, which are not tax deductible.
Provided that the value of the home remains at or above its
initial $500,000 assessed value, the homeowner can still hope to
cash out this equity upon a sale of the property. This is important
because for most homeowners, the equity in their homes is the most
significant savings—often the only savings—they possess. 31 If the
value decreases, however, the homeowner will begin to lose equity.
The more the value of the home falls, the more equity the
homeowner loses. If the home’s value drops to the point that the
homeowner’s equity is wiped out, the homeowner is “underwater”—
she owes more on the property than the home is worth. 32 The
homeowner is now in the untenable position of either continuing to
pay a large mortgage on an asset of depreciated value in which she
has no equity, or walking away from a home into which she has
already invested a substantial amount. The latter course may seem
more appealing, but will surely result in a diminished credit rating
and perhaps also a deficiency judgment by the lender to recover the
amount still owed from whatever other assets the homeowner
possesses. 33 For all of these reasons, home buyers are very keen to

29. See id. § 1.4 (describing concept of equity).
30. For an example of a typical 30-year, fully amortizing mortgage, see id. § 1.1.
31. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4 (providing data showing that
for most homeowners, “the equity in their homes is the most important savings they have”).
32. See Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010).
33. See id. at 983–86 (explaining consequences of “walking away” from an underwater
mortgage). White argues that these consequences are not very significant by comparison to the
benefits of shedding a severely underwater mortgage. He may be right that walking away is a
better option than continuing to pay down an underwater mortgage, but the point here is that
both options are bad from the perspective of a homeowner who has invested her life savings into
her home.
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ensure that the value of their property does not decline from the date
of purchase.
This, ultimately, is why zoning is such an important factor in an
individual’s decision to purchase a home. Given the size of the
investment and the stakes for the homeowner if property values
diminish, a prospective purchaser needs the assurance that property
values will not diminish as a condition of making this investment. In
the event, therefore, that the regulatory authority chooses to alter
the zoning in the neighborhood so as to permit more intense uses,
the homeowner loses the protection against unwanted change that
induced her to purchase the home at a premium price initially, and
the value of the property will very likely decline. As it does so, it may
trigger the parade of horribles canvassed above.
The foregoing explains why many homeowners think they have a
protected reliance interest in the zoning of their property. A
disinterested observer might wonder, though, whether it is reasonable
for a homeowner to invest such enormous resources in a single asset
under the expectation that the zoning will never change. After all,
zoning ordinances usually have built-in mechanisms to facilitate
change, such as variances, special use permits, and rezonings. 34
Homeowners are presumptively aware of these mechanisms before
they purchase their homes, and zoning’s susceptibility to change is
presumably also capitalized into property values. The law, of course,
only provides protection for reasonable expectations, so this may
explain why courts do not recognize neighbors’ vested rights claims.

2. The federal government’s role in inducing reliance
If purchasing a home in reliance on pre-existing zoning were
unreasonable, however, then it must be asked why millions of
Americans have been doing just that for the past century. Home
ownership in this country skyrocketed after zoning was widely
adopted in the early twentieth century, and policymakers, historians,
and economists have all concluded that zoning was a major factor in
sparking the home ownership craze. 35 Indeed, it has long been
34. See, e.g., SELMI ET AL., supra note 15, at 69–106 (discussing various mechanisms
municipalities use to exercise flexibility in the land use approval process).
35. In the years between 1922 and 1929, “new homes were begun at the rate of 883,000
per year, a pace more than double that of any previous seven-year period.” KENNETH JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 175 (1985). Peter Hall
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public policy at the national level to induce Americans to incur
massive amounts of debt to purchase homes by providing them with
the assurance that their investment would be protected against
unpredictable declines in value. Two principal tools have been used
to accomplish this goal: zoning and mortgage lending policy. To start
with the first, zoning was initially adopted during an age of rapid
urbanization and industrialization, which entailed the increasing
introduction of intense industrial uses in close proximity to more
delicate commercial and residential neighborhoods. 36 This caused
property values to become extremely unstable as potential investors
could not reliably predict the future of areas in which they chose to
invest. 37 City leaders in the early twentieth century quickly turned to
zoning as a solution to this problem; as one early zoning advocate
put it, zoning would provide “greater safety and security in
investment” 38 by stabilizing property values against unpredictable
change. Secretary of Commerce (later President) Herbert Hoover saw
zoning specifically as a means of facilitating homeownership, which
he believed would be the foundation of a prosperous society. 39
Hoover spearheaded a very successful movement to encourage
municipalities nationwide to adopt comprehensive zoning
ordinances. 40 Shortly thereafter, in the famous case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 41 the Supreme Court placed its
imprimatur on zoning, which the Court saw as an effective
mechanism for protecting single-family residential neighborhoods

identifies zoning along with federal government-guaranteed mortgages, new highways, and the
baby boom as key factors in the post-World War II suburban homeownership boom. See PETER
HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW 316–22 (3d ed. 2002).
36. See generally SEYMOUR TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 35–116 (1969) (describing early origins
of zoning).
37. See Bosselman, supra note 25, at 567–72 (describing how uncertainty over property
values led to early zoning ordinances in turn-of-the-century Chicago).
38. See HALL, supra note 35, at 317–18 (quoting New York City Commission on Building
Heights); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II – Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM L.
REV. 346, 367 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part II] (“By precluding undesirable
changes in land use and providing a firm basis for predicting the future physical and social
evolution of the community, zoning reduced the risks to investors in urban real estate.”).
39. See Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the
Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1256–63 (2008).
40. The keystone of this effort was the adoption in 1922 of the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act (SSZEA). See id.
41. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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42

against invasion by more intense uses. Home ownership and the
municipal adoption of zoning ordinances soared in the years after
Hoover’s efforts and the Euclid decision. 43
In the 1930s, policymakers began to encourage home purchases
in another way: they created federal housing agencies such as the
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and later the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), which were empowered to insure or
guarantee privately issued home loans so that lenders would liberally
offer low-interest, long-term loans with low down payments to a
broad class of consumers. 44 The U.S. Government made mortgages
even more attractive by offering a generous income tax deduction for
mortgage interest payments. 45 These policies effectively made it
cheaper for Americans to buy than to rent, 46 giving them a strong
incentive to assume a large amount of debt to finance a home
purchase.
Federal mortgage policy was thus closely linked with zoning
policy—both were designed to encourage home purchases. 47 But
mortgage policy and zoning were connected in a deeper way as well.
An important underlying premise of the mortgage lending policy,
like zoning, was that home values were primarily a function of
neighborhood character and neighborhood stability, not simply of
the qualities of the home itself. The lending agencies appraised the
value of properties and their suitability for credit by determining
how likely their surrounding neighborhoods were to maintain their
existing character over time, looking at factors such as the age, size
and type of housing stock in the neighborhood, the proximity of the
neighborhood to other neighborhoods undergoing change, and, most
infamously, the racial composition of the neighborhood. 48 Given its

42. See id. at 394 (enumerating the benefits of segregating single-family residential areas
from other types of uses).
43. Whereas at the end of 1916, just eight cities had enacted zoning ordinances, by the
end of the 1920’s, nearly eight-hundred municipalities had done so. See TOLL, supra note 36, at
193.
44. See HALL, supra note 35, at 318–19; JACKSON, supra note 35, at 195–218 (describing
HOLC and FHA).
45. See JACKSON, supra note 35, at 293–94.
46. See id. at 205 (“Quite simply, it often became cheaper to buy than to rent.”).
47. See HALL, supra note 35, at 319 (“The central objective of the FHA was identical with
that of zoning: it was to guarantee the security of residential real-estate values.”).
48. See id. at 197–203 (HOLC policy), 207–218 (FHA policy). The agencies’ policies of

966

DO NOT DELETE

949

1/27/2014 10:26 AM

Reliance in Land Use Law

focus on the neighborhood, the FHA naturally endorsed the use of
single-use zoning that would ensure neighborhood homogeneity. 49
The sum total of these federal housing policies has been to
strongly incentivize Americans to assume massive amounts of debt
to finance home purchases by providing them with the assurance
that the value of their homes would be protected through zoning
ordinances that stabilize the character of the entire neighborhood. Thus,
it is not so easy to dismiss, as the courts so often have, a
homeowner’s claim that she should have vested rights in the zoning
classification of her neighborhood at the time of purchase. Indeed,
judged by either the fairness or the efficiency criterion courts have
employed to assess developers’ reliance claims, the homeowner
appears to have a fairly convincing case for judicial protection of her
expectations. From the fairness perspective, considering that it has
been long-standing national policy to induce Americans to incur
substantial debt to finance home purchases with the assurance that
home values would be protected against adverse land use changes,
equity counsels that homeowners should be entitled to at least as
much relief as the developer who has made substantial expenditures
in good faith reliance on a development permit or site-specific
rezoning. In fact, the homeowner’s case may be even more
compelling than the developer’s. Many developers are in the
business of taking risks on real estate and have the ability to
diversify that risk across numerous projects. The homeowner, by
contrast, typically only makes one real estate investment—the family
home—which is by far the most significant financial investment of
that person’s lifetime.50 The only rational reason a homeowner
would take what seems to be such a substantial financial risk on a
single asset is because lawmakers have deliberately undertaken to

designating mixed-race and minority neighborhoods as unacceptable credit risks, deemed
“redlining,” has of course been extremely controversial, and has been cited as a central cause of
urban decay and interlocal segregation in many metropolitan regions. See id.; see also JANE JACOBS,
THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 295–302 (1961) (“There is no telling how many
city districts have been destroyed by [redlining].”). I return to the subject of interlocal
segregation in Part IV, infra.
49. See JACKSON, supra note 35, at 207–208 (FHA endorsed zoning and restrictive
covenants that would maintain neighborhood homogeneity).
50. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 10–11, 30 (distinguishing
homeowners from other investors by noting lack of diversification of assets); id. at 4 (noting that
home equity is most Americans’ most significant asset).
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remove the risk. It would be extremely harsh and unfair for
government to induce home purchases by insuring that investment
against risk only to then reintroduce the risk after the purchase has
been made, thereby catalyzing a decline in property values and
leaving it to the homeowner to confront the likely consequences
(loss of equity, diminished credit rating, and a possible deficiency
judgment).
With regard to efficiency, I noted previously that one reason
courts protect developers’ reliance interests is to induce investment
in real property—what developer would sink substantial resources
into a parcel of land if the municipality could just change the rules
and wipe out the investment at any time? Likewise, the very
justification for federal mortgage lending and zoning policy has been
to encourage investment in home ownership by removing
purchasers’ concerns about investing in an asset of uncertain and
unpredictable value. 51 Moreover, the reason national policymakers
have seen fit to encourage homeownership on a massive scale is
because it has long been a staple of national lore that
homeownership carries numerous advantages, such as ensuring that
individuals have a stake in the community and the affairs of local
government, instilling respect for the institution of private property,
and providing a salutary environment for families. 52 Thus, there is a
strong efficiency argument for recognizing homeowners’ reliance
interests.
In sum, homeowners have a pretty convincing case that their
reliance interests are at least as deserving of judicial protection as
developers. Yet, as mentioned previously, courts have expressly held
that neighbors simply have no vested rights to maintain pre-existing
53
zoning. Courts rarely state their reasons for foreclosing relief to
neighbors, however, and the reasons they do provide are not very
persuasive.54 In the remainder of this Article, I seek to discover the
51. See supra text accompanying notes 35–53.
52. For a sampling of the arguments advanced in favor of homeownership, see, for
example, JACKSON, supra note 35, at 45–72, 190–95.
53. See supra note 25.
54. The most frequently stated rationale is that awarding neighbors a vested reliance
interest in existing zoning would make it impossible for municipal authorities to change zoning
ordinances to meet changing conditions. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731,
733 (N.Y. 1951) (“Changed or changing conditions call for changed plans, and persons who own
property in a particular zone or use district enjoy no eternally vested right to that classification if
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real reason why courts make this distinction. As it turns out, the
answer to this seemingly narrow doctrinal question goes to the heart
of the judicial approach to municipal land use decision making, and
in the process reveals the deeply flawed nature of that approach.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY: THE EVIDENCE FROM REGULATORY
TAKINGS LAW
As an initial matter, I suspect that one reason courts distinguish
developers’ reliance claims from those of neighbors is simple
administrative efficiency. In short, while neighbors may often have a
legitimate grievance when the zoning is changed, courts worry that it
would create insurmountable administrative difficulties to judicially
recognize a remedy for such a grievance, given the enormous number
of neighbors who could plausibly claim to have endured a
depreciation in property values from any particular regulatory
change. By contrast, recognizing the reliance-based claims of
developers who have undertaken substantial improvements based on
some site-specific regulatory assurance is a much more manageable
task because that class is likely to be far smaller and more easily
identified. I conclude that this explanation has some persuasive
force, but is ultimately unsatisfying. It nevertheless proves
important, for it will light the way toward a more compelling
account of why courts distinguish developers’ from neighbors’
reliance claims.
As I mentioned earlier, courts are rarely explicit about why they
make this distinction between developers and neighbors.
Nevertheless, an analogous doctrinal area, the law of regulatory
takings, provides some evidence that the courts may indeed be
driven by the administrative concerns sketched in the preceding
paragraph. Consider one of the more important recent Supreme

the public interest demands otherwise.”). This is an unsatisfying explanation, however, because
it proves too much: if it has any validity, it would be an equally powerful rejoinder to developers’
vested rights claims, which likewise require a municipality to “freeze” its regulatory regime at a
particular point in time. Indeed, those courts that have been most resistant to developers’ vested
rights claims have argued that recognizing such rights would hamstrings municipalities’
flexibility in dealing with changing circumstances. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v.
S. Coast Reg’l Comm’n, 553 P.2d 546, 553 (Cal. 1976). Yet, the majority of courts continue to
recognize that developers do acquire vested rights at some point in the approval process,
whereas neighbors can never acquire vested rights.
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Court decisions on regulatory takings, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.55 There, legislation by the state of South Carolina designed
to prevent beach erosion on a barrier island prohibited the plaintiff
from building any “occupiable improvements” 56 on land he owned.
Based upon a trial court finding that the prohibition rendered
plaintiff’s land economically “valueless,” 57 the Supreme Court held
that where a regulation “denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land,” 58 the regulation amounts to a taking of
property under the Fifth Amendment, unless the regulation
coincides with some independent common-law prohibition on the
use of land such as the law of nuisance. 59 In practice, this means
that a landowner has at least some right to alter the land from its
natural state—to develop it—free from state interference, so long as
she is not committing a common-law nuisance. 60 By negative
implication, those who may have an interest in leaving land
undeveloped, such as neighboring landowners whose land may now
be threatened by beach erosion, are out of luck unless they can assert
a common-law cause of action against the would-be developer. Like
the vested rights doctrine, here the Court privileges developers at
the expense of neighboring landowners.
The key to understanding the disparate treatment that the Lucas
court accords developers and neighbors lies in a provocative
footnote. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s holding
would have arbitrary results because the landowner whose property
suffered a 100% loss of all economic value due to a government
regulation would get fully compensated under the Court’s
“valueless” rule, whereas a landowner who suffered a 95% or even a
99% wipeout would get no compensation. 61 In a footnote, the Court
agreed that this outcome was possible, but argued: “that occasional
55. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
56. Id. at 1009.
57. Id. at 1020.
58. Id. at 1015.
59. See id. at 1029–30.
60. See id. at 1018 (stating that deprivation of all economically beneficial or productive
use of property typically takes the form of “requiring land to be left substantially in its natural
state”); cf. id. at 1031 (citations omitted) (referring to the “erection of any habitable or
productive improvements” as an “‘essential use” of one’s land).
61. See id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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result is no more strange than the landowner whose premises are
taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose
property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway (who
recovers nothing). Takings law is full of these ‘all-or-nothing’
situations.” 62 The Court’s footnote references a common issue in
takings law, that of so-called “condemnation blight,” in which the
government’s condemnation of one parcel of land (here, for a
highway) causes neighboring properties to suffer a diminution in
property value (as a result of increased noise, traffic congestion,
environmental degradation, diminished quality of life, and so forth).
Courts have uniformly held, as the Lucas majority correctly notes,
that the owner of the condemned property is entitled to
compensation for what was taken, but absent something more, the
neighboring landowners are entitled to nothing for the diminution in
property value. 63 Thus, as we have seen in the case of vested rights,
the law refuses compensation for neighbors who endure a decline in
property values as a result of some government activity, but provides
compensation for some other class of affected landowners, despite
the relative equivalence in the quantum of injury suffered by both
classes.
The Lucas footnote does not explicitly answer why takings law
makes these subtle differentiations, but commentators have filled in
the blanks. According to the commentators, the rationale for this
distinction is administrative efficiency. 64 The introduction of a new
62. Id. at 1019 n.8.
63. A recent case is City of L.A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011). There, the city of Los Angeles acquired a number of properties in the vicinity of
Los Angeles International Airport and demolished them, leaving the land vacant. Several nearby
landowners complained that the city’s actions had drastically diminished the value of their
property. The court held, however, these facts were insufficient to state a cause of action for a
taking, absent a physical occupation of the complaining landowners’ property. See also FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 169–71 (describing condemnation blight and arguing on
efficiency grounds that landowners should often be compensated when properties are devalued
by nearby condemnation); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L.
REV. 277 (2001) (arguing that condemnation blight is a “derivative taking” that should be
compensable).
64. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 75 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing that
“[w]hen a government regulation affecting property values is general in its application”
government will face enormous difficulties “identifying and then transacting with” everyone
affected). Frank Michelman similarly argues that liability for takings should ordinarily be denied
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land use such as a busy highway in a once quiet rural town may have
numerous adverse impacts, and these impacts can extend
imperceptibly for a considerable distance. Because capitalization
studies show that home values are sensitive to even slight changes in
the local environment,65 any land use change could conceivably give
rise to a very large number of plausible claims by homeowners that
the change has caused some diminution of their property values. If a
court were to hold that the diminution in property value suffered by
an adjacent landowner was alone sufficient to state a compensable
takings claim, then any other landowner who could likewise
establish that the land use change resulted in some decrease in his or
her property values would seemingly be entitled to compensation,
even if the property in question were located at a considerable
distance from the new land use and suffered only a de minimis
decrease in value. The potential claimants could number in the
dozens or even hundreds. Courts would be flooded with litigation
and tasked with the unenviable chore of determining whose injuries
are sufficiently severe to warrant compensation, 66 while legislatures
would have to worry that every regulatory intervention would
subject them to massive liability for damages. Limiting recovery to
those whose land was actually condemned seemingly solves these
problems. The class is relatively smaller and more discrete, and there
is a fair presumption that a physical occupation of one’s land has
caused fairly serious injury to the landowner. Thus, courts are
relieved of having to make fine distinctions and legislatures need
only condemn land in the path of the proposed highway. In other
words, the juridical distinction between the owner whose land is
taken for a highway and the owner whose land is devalued by the
highway has nothing to do with any presumed difference in the

where “settlement costs” are high. He defines settlement costs as “the dollar value of the time,
effort and resources which would be required in order to reach [adequate] compensation
settlements. . . . Included are the costs of settling not only the particular compensation claims
presented, but also those of all persons . . . not obviously distinguishable by the available
settlement apparatus.” Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
65. See supra notes 26–27 (discussing capitalization).
66. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 299–300 (discussing traditional concern with
opening “floodgates” in condemnation blight cases). Bell and Parchomovsky go on, however, to
claim that the administration problem can be easily cured by requiring landowners seeking
compensation to self-assess their damages. See id. at 300–04.

972

DO NOT DELETE

949

1/27/2014 10:26 AM

Reliance in Land Use Law

magnitude of injury endured by the two landowners, but entirely to
do with the relative ability of the state’s administrative apparatus to
address their respective grievances.
Courts are perhaps understandably reluctant to state outright
that seemingly arbitrary administrative concerns cause them to deny
recompense to many landowners with compelling claims for relief.
Nevertheless, the logic of administration is implicit in the text of the
Lucas decision. The Court notes that the practical reason why courts
generally permit “the government, by regulation, to affect property
values without compensation” 67 is that “[g]overnment could hardly
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.” 68 This consideration, however, “does not apply to the relatively
rare situation where the government has deprived a landowner of all
economically beneficial uses.” 69 In other words, the class of
individuals whose property values stand to be diminished by
government regulation is so large that “government could hardly go
on” if it were forced to either compensate all of those individuals for
the diminution in property values or forego regulation entirely.
However, the total wipeout of all economic value is sufficiently rare
that government would only have to bear the very manageable
burden of making the occasional payment to a truly aggrieved
landowner, or regulating in a way that has a less harsh impact on
that particular landowner. The individual who has suffered the total
wipeout, then, is much like the landowner whose property has been
taken for a highway in that she is likely to be a member of a very
small and easily identifiable class to which courts can award
recompense without creating too many headaches for themselves or
for legislatures.
The logic of Lucas and the condemnation blight cases easily
extends to the differential treatment accorded developers’ and
neighbors’ reliance interests in pre-existing land use regulations.
Given the highly diffuse nature of modern land use impacts, the
number of homeowners who could plausibly claim to have suffered a
depreciation in property values from a single adverse land use

67. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
68. Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
69. Id.
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change is apt to be very large and amorphous. 70 Awarding
recompense to every member of this class, or attempting to ascertain
a dividing line between compensable and noncompensable claims
within this class, would be administratively impractical. Courts
would be inundated with litigation, often with complex evidentiary
problems involving the extent of the diminution of property value,
and they would have little way of precisely delimiting the group of
homeowners who could bring a cognizable claim for relief. The
ability of fiscally-strapped legislatures to adopt broadly applicable
regulations would be greatly impeded by the prospect of dozens or
perhaps even hundreds of claimants entitled to relief for every
diminution in property values. By contrast, limiting vested rights
claims to developers who have made substantial expenditures and
whose claims are based on some site-specific criteria (such as a
permit application or small-scale rezoning) rather than a broad
regulatory regime necessarily circumscribes the class of claimants to
a small, discrete, and easily identified group, all of whose members,
by virtue of having made substantial expenditures in reliance on a
pre-existing regulatory regime, can be fairly presumed to have
endured considerable harm from the regulatory change. 71
The foregoing account of why courts differentiate developers’
from neighbors’ reliance interests, while adequate as a descriptive
matter, is also disquieting. Because the administrative concerns
described above require that recovery be limited to a small and
discrete class, it is necessarily the case that courts will only recognize
a viable cause of action, as Lucas appears to acknowledge, in
relatively “rare” cases. 72 This means that a great many plaintiffs who
are deserving of recompense will be turned out of court on the rather
70. This concern appears to be captured in the case of Hecton v. People ex rel. Dep’t of
Transp., 58 Cal. App. 3d 653 (1976). There, the plaintiff claimed that a diminution of property
values allegedly attributable to condemnation of neighboring properties for the construction of a
freeway resulted in a taking of his property. The court disagreed, noting that “[t]he economic
ramifications of the construction of a freeway are complex and unbounded.” Id. at 658.
71. The distinction between a small, discernible class and a large amorphous class may
also explain why some courts have limited standing in spot zoning challenges to those who have
suffered “special damages” above those suffered by the public as a whole. See supra note 25; see
also SMITH & HAND, supra note 15, § 8:5 (discussing standing requirements for spot zoning
challenges). This distinction may also underlie the administrative law dichotomy between
legislative and quasi-adjudicative decisions, which I take up infra at text accompanying notes
159–81.
72. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
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arbitrary grounds of administrative efficiency. Indeed, although it
appears to have been Lucas’s purpose to provide more robust
protection for developers against intrusive government regulation
than the pre-existing regulatory takings law offered, development
advocates have been quick to criticize Lucas on the grounds that the
“total wipeout” is so rare as to hardly ever appear in practice. 73
Likewise, developers have frequently lamented that the protection
offered by the common-law vested rights doctrine is plainly
inadequate because the threshold for establishing vested rights is so
high. 74
Perhaps it is simply the case that courts have self-consciously
sacrificed fairness to particular claimants in the interests of
administrative expediency. But Lucas and other takings cases do
purport to take account of the concerns of equity as well as those of
administration. In asserting that the landowner who suffers a total
wipeout is entitled to special solicitude, Lucas states that:
[I]n the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to
indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply
“adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life” in a manner
that secures an “average reciprocity of advantage” to everyone
concerned. 75

The Court here expresses a familiar concern in regulatory takings
jurisprudence that the burden of government regulation should, as a
matter of fairness, fall generally on the public and not be borne
disproportionately by an individual or small group of landowners. 76
For the Lucas court, this means that the public at large should not be
73. For discussion and criticism of Lucas, see, for example, Epstein, supra note 17, at
1369. See also Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering Property
Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759 (2006).
74. See supra note 24 (discussing efforts by developers to strengthen vested rights
protections by statute).
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017–18 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
76. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)(quoted in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071) (the takings clause “was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”). But see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 133
(“Legislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than
others.”).
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able to enjoy for free the benefits of protection against beach erosion
by imposing the burden of a total wipeout on a single landowner or
small handful of landowners.
If this logic is accepted, however, then there is a strong case that
the law’s protection should extend to at least some neighbors’
reliance interests. One of the central problems with the siting of
highways and other so-called “locally undesirable land uses”
(LULUs) such as shopping malls, nightclubs, or garbage dumps is
that while they bring benefits to the region or city as a whole, their
costs (increased noise, traffic congestion, and so on) are largely
borne locally by those landowners in the vicinity of the new land use,
in the form of depreciated property values. 77 While the group of
landowners adversely affected by a new LULU may be sizeable in
comparison to those relatively rare individuals who suffer a total
wipeout or who have built up significant reliance interests based on
some site-specific regulatory activity, it is nevertheless difficult to
“indulge our usual assumption” that the “burdens and benefits of
economic life” are being distributed relatively evenly when one
group of landowners is asked to shoulder such a heavy burden in
order to confer a benefit on the general public. Given that fact, it
seems courts should provide at least some solicitude for neighbors’
reliance interests in pre-existing zoning regulations. Why, then, do
they not?
III. A PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF RELIANCE INTERESTS
Contrary to appearances, the courts are actually very cognizant
and, indeed, protective of neighbors’ reliance interests. How can this
be the case when courts repeatedly reject neighbors’ reliance-based
claims? This Part argues that the reason courts opt not to provide
judicial protection for homeowners’ reliance interests is because they
intuit that homeowners have sufficient influence with the local
governmental authorities that make most land use decisions to
protect their own reliance interests through the political process (by,
for example, pressing for zoning regulations that tightly restrict new
development). For this very reason, however, courts suspect that the
local political process is likely to disadvantage developers, especially
77. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 789–90 (1994); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 63, at 290–94.
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where a developer has already sunk substantial resources into a
particular project and is thus incapable of escaping an oppressive
regulatory regime except at great cost. As a result, courts are likely
to deny judicial protection for neighbors’ reliance interests while
extending it to those developers who have undertaken substantial
expenditures in reliance on a pre-existing, regulatory status quo.
This narrative dovetails neatly with the administrative efficiency
account detailed in the preceding Part. Deferring neighbors’ reliance
interests to the political process allows courts to escape from the
dilemma of either providing judicial protection for such interests and
thereby creating an administrative nightmare or denying such
protection and thereby depriving many deserving claimants of relief.
Courts can rest easy that they need not intervene to protect
neighbors’ reliance interests because the political process is perfectly
adequate to do so. Moreover, the very fact that creates the divide in
administrability between neighbors’ and developers’ reliance
interests—the relative size of the class affected—also explains the
disparity in political power between these groups. The relatively
large size of the class of homeowners accounts for both why the
judiciary is incapable of providing effective protection for
homeowners’ reliance interests and why we can expect homeowners
to be influential in the local political process, whereas the relatively
smaller size of the class of developers with substantial reliance
interests makes that class both more susceptible of judicial
protection and less likely to prevail in the political sphere. 78
In its emphasis on political process, this Part follows in the
tradition of “public choice” scholarship. Public choice theory
emphasizes that judicial doctrine should reflect the practical realities
of the political system, particularly the extent to which interest
groups have the ability to organize and influence the political
process. 79 This interest-group perspective has spawned an influential
theory of judicial review, which suggests that courts should broadly
defer to a political process that seems to be working effectively and
intervene to shore up that process where it disadvantages “discrete

78. See POSNER, supra 64, at 75 (“[A] regulation, because it affects more people than a
single taking, is more likely to mobilize effective political opposition.”).
79. See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 13; STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 13.
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and insular minorities” who cannot effectively form interest
groups. 80
A number of scholars have applied public choice theory to land
use decision making, with most focusing specifically on the law of
regulatory takings. 81 Saul Levmore, for example, uses public choice
theory to explain the distinction we have seen in takings law
between physical occupations and regulatory burdens (the
“condemnation blight” scenario). Because relatively fewer
individuals will have their property condemned than will see their
property values decline from a nearby condemnation, the former will
have a less effective opportunity than the latter to influence the
political process to press their interests. He writes:
[P]hysical takings (as opposed to regulatory or tax burdens) usually
burden fewer people, who will have relatively more trouble
organizing into a political force. Often the government takes
property from just one or two property owners, while regulatory
burdens almost always affect large numbers . . . . [T]he
nonphysical burdens of such a project are likely to fall on thousands
of properties (such as the homeowners who lose value because of
noise from the new highway) whose owners can more easily
organize than can the set of owners whose properties are physically
taken. 82

Levmore argues accordingly that regulatory takings law appropriately
awards compensation to those whose land has been condemned but
not to those whose property values have been affected by a
condemnation.
In the following Part, I refine the public choice account in two
principal ways. First, I argue that reliance, rather than merely group
size, has driven the disparity in political power between developers
and homeowners. On one hand, the large size of a group is no
assurance of political power, because organization is often more
80. This theory of judicial review traces its origins to the Supreme Court’s famous fourth
footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and was most
fully elaborated in John Hart Ely’s classic work DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 73–179 (1980). Under this theory, the judiciary’s proper role is one of monitoring the
political process to ensure that it has incorporated the appropriate degree of deliberation,
accommodation of competing interests, and solicitude for minorities.
81. See, e.g., FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 114–40; Michelman, supra
note 64, at 1217–18.
82. Levmore, supra note 14, at 320.
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important than sheer size; indeed, public choice scholarship has
demonstrated that smaller groups can often organize much more
effectively than larger groups. 83 What assures homeowners of
political power, in addition to their relative size, is that their
enormous stake in their homes gives them tremendous motivation
to organize and be involved in local politics in order to protect their
property values. On the other hand, although developers may be a
small and politically isolated group, they can easily resist unfavorable
regulation in one municipality to the extent they can simply exit to a
neighboring jurisdiction. Once a developer invests substantial
resources into a particular project, however, her exit costs rise
dramatically and make it harder for her to escape an exploitative
regulatory regime. Thus, reliance interests play a central role in
explaining both the homeowners’ predominance within the local
political process and the developer’s vulnerability within that same
process.
The second refinement is that courts have not simply accepted
the descriptive point that homeowners tend to be powerful and
adjusted the doctrine around that reality. Rather, courts have taken
an affirmative role in enabling homeowners to capture the political
process for their own ends, perhaps because courts are all too keenly
aware of their own institutional limitations in directly enforcing
homeowners’ reliance interests. The courts have facilitated
homeowner domination of the local political process principally in
two ways: 1) they have broadly legitimized municipalities’ use of the
zoning power to protect homeowners’ reliance interests; and 2) they
have liberally endorsed state policies that favor the proliferation of
small suburban municipalities in which homeowners can be assured
of being the politically dominant faction. This last point offers an
ironic twist on the public choice account: while that account hinges
on the class of homeowners being sufficiently large to have political
clout and defy judicial cognizability, it also demands that the class be
sufficiently small to permit effective organization and domination of
the local political process. This reinforces my point that organization

83. See MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (postulating that small
groups of intensely interested individuals can more effectively organize as interest groups than
large groups whose members are each less intensely interested).
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is at least as important as size in assuring that homeowners are
politically powerful.
Once we understand the role courts have played in creating a
“majoritarian” local political process that systematically favors
homeowners, we can likewise understand why they are especially
solicitous of developers’ reliance interests. A small polity dominated
by a particular faction with fairly uniform interests raises the classic
Madisonian concern that a politically unpopular minority (here,
developers) may be consistently exploited within the political
84
process. Thus, it makes sense that courts would complement their
deference to a political process dominated by homeowners with
special judicial solicitude for developers in circumstances where
developers would be especially susceptible to majoritarian
exploitation—such as, where they have expended substantial
resources in reliance on a site-specific regulatory assurance.
Section A below explains how homeowners’ reliance interests,
combined with the assistance of the courts, enables homeowners to
come out ahead in the local political process under the basic public
choice model. Section B then shows how courts’ solicitude for
developers’ reliance interests can likewise be traced to the public
choice model.

A. Homeowners and the Public Choice Model of Local Government
According to economist William Fischel, local politics are
dominated by “homevoters”: homeowners who consistently press for
policies that will maximize the value of their most valuable asset—
their homes.85 This means, among other things, that homevoters
will consistently place pressure on municipal authorities for highly
restrictive zoning regulations that prevent the siting of any new
development that may threaten property values. 86 For this reason,
homevoters have often been given the derisive moniker NIMBYs
(“Not in My Backyard”). Because these NIMBYs/homevoters are the

84. See infra text accompanying notes 150–59 (on Madison’s concern with faction and
how it applies to land use politics in small municipalities).
85. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4–12, 72–93.
86. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 8 (discussing various Land Use conflicts involving
NIMBYs (“Not in my backyard”)).
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dominant political faction in most municipalities, local governments
must accede to their wishes.
What makes homevoters so dominant in local politics? In part,
as Levmore notes, it is a question of numbers. Most municipalities
accord voting rights only to residents of the municipality.87 And the
majority of local governments in the United States are small,
suburban municipalities in which the overwhelming majority of
residents, and hence voters, are homeowners. 88
It is curious, though, that theorists like Levmore would place so
much emphasis on size when one of the most critical insights of
public choice theory is that smaller groups often do a better job of
organizing to influence public policy than larger groups. 89 This is
both because smaller groups face fewer barriers to organizing—for
example, they can more easily identify sympathizers and police freeriding—and because regulation tends to visit benefits and burdens
disproportionately on particular small groups, providing those
groups with the motivation to be politically active. 90 As Daniel
Farber states, in a critique of Levmore, “[i]f public choice has any
one key finding, it is that small groups with high stakes have a
disproportionately great influence on the political process.” 91
The major reason homeowners are so politically powerful at the
local level is thus not their size, but the “high stakes” they possess in
local politics; that is, their reliance interests. As discussed in Part
I.B., homeowners stand to lose a great deal if their property values
depreciate from the date of purchase, and property values are heavily
determined by a municipality’s zoning regulations. 92 As Fischel has
87. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 440.
88. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part I] (stating that threequarters of municipalities have fewer than 55,000 residents); Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 4, at
145 (stating that two-thirds of homes are owner-occupied and homeowners vote fifty percent
more frequently than renters).
89. See OLSEN, supra note 83 (postulating that small groups of intensely interested
individuals can more effectively organize as interest groups than large groups whose members
are each less intensely interested).
90. See generally Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 37–41 (1991).
91. See Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289
(1992).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 26–33.
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detailed, the size of the homeowner’s stake gives her a huge
incentive to be active in the local political process in order to ensure
that the political process operates to protect the value of her home. 93
Indeed, we recall that one of the central purposes of the longstanding national policy in favor of homeownership has been
precisely to induce Americans to have a stake in the affairs of
government. 94 Thus, the combination of size and motivation makes
the homeowner a powerful force in local politics.
Perhaps an equally important factor in explaining homeowner
dominance in local government is the role of the courts. After some
initial reluctance, courts have repeatedly affirmed that municipalities
may legitimately use the zoning power to protect homeowners’
reliance interests. Furthermore, courts have played an active role in
facilitating homeowner control of the local political process by
broadly affirming state policies that enable homeowners to create
local governments in which they call the shots. In short, despite the
superficial appearance that courts are not particularly concerned
about homeowners’ reliance interests, in reality courts have taken
major steps to empower homeowners to protect their own reliance
interests, thus obviating the need for courts to provide direct judicial
protection for those interests.

1. Judicial deference to zoning
For the past century, courts have accepted as a matter of course
that zoning is a legitimate means of protecting the reliance interests
of homeowners. When zoning was first introduced in the United
States in the early twentieth century, many courts greeted it with
considerable skepticism, seeing zoning as an encroachment on a
landowner’s constitutional right to make unrestricted use of her
property 95 and a crude means of social segregation. 96 Rather quickly,
93. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 8–12, 30, 74–76; see also
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 259 (“[M]ost voters in smaller jurisdictions are
homeowners. They have an incentive to pay attention to politics: good decisions will increase the
value of their major asset, and bad ones will reduce it. Political scientists have long been
impressed by the high rate of participation by middle-class homeowners in local politics.”).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52.
95. See Ignaciunas v. Risley, 121 A. 783, 785 (N.J. 1923) (“A law which forbids a certain
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though, the judicial tide turned in favor of zoning, as courts began to
recognize the desirability of stabilizing single-family residential
neighborhoods. In the landmark Euclid decision, the United States
Supreme Court heartily endorsed zoning as a useful means for
preventing the invasion of unwanted uses into single-family
residential neighborhoods, despite the fact that the zoning ordinance
at issue caused the appellant to suffer a 75% decline in the value of
its property because of new use restrictions. 97
Early decisions made it clear that zoning was legitimate because
it aimed to secure a society of homeowners with a firm stake in the
affairs of government. For example, in upholding a zoning ordinance
that created exclusive districts for single-family homes, the
California Supreme Court stated:
The establishment of single family residence districts offers
inducements, not only to the wealthy, but to those of moderate
means to own their own homes. With ownership comes stability . .
. . With ownership comes increased interest in the promotion of
public agencies, such as church and school, which have for their
purpose a desired development of the moral and mental make-up of
the citizenry of the country. With ownership of one’s home comes
recognition of the individual’s responsibility for his share in the
safeguarding of the welfare of the community . . . . 98

Courts likewise lauded zoning for protecting homeowners’
expectations in pre-existing property values. According to one court:
“The stabilizing of property values, and giving some assurance to the
public that, if property is purchased in a residential district, its value as
such will be preserved, is probably the most cogent reason back of
zoning ordinances.” 99
use of property deprives it of an essential attribute. The result in effect is a proscription of its
ownership.”); Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514–15 (Tex. 1921) (“The substantial value
of property lies in its use. If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated
and ownership is rendered a barren right.”).
96. Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (“In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and
segregate them according to their income or situation in life.”).
97. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
98. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works of L.A., 234 P. 381, 387 (Cal. 1925).
99. Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541, 548 (D. Kan. 1928); see also Flower Hill Bldg. Corp.
v. Vill. of Flower Hill, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (purpose of zoning ordinance is
to protect residents against “radical zoning changes” that will diminish property values).
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Ever since zoning’s legitimacy was established in the early part of
the century, courts have repeatedly cited the protection of property
values as one of zoning’s central purposes and have found that
purpose sufficiently weighty to immunize zoning against all manner
of legal challenges. 100 In a similar vein, courts have frequently held
that the protection of neighboring landowners’ reliance interests in a
pre-existing regulatory scheme is a legitimate reason for
municipalities to decline to change their zoning regulations. 101
100. See, e.g., Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1993) (no due
process violation in refusing authorization to site a warehouse in a residential neighborhood
because record showed that city’s decision was motivated by concerns over safety, traffic, noise,
and decreased property values); Greenbriar v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1989)
(no due process violation because city’s refusal to authorize rezoning was rationally based on
concerns that rezoning would cause decrease in neighboring property values); Dry Creek
Partners, LLC v. Ada Cnty. Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 1282, 1291 (Idaho 2009) (zoning’s valid
purposes include “preventing visual blight, stabilizing neighborhoods, maintaining
neighborhood property values, and preserving the character of the community”); City of
Lewiston v. Knieriem, 685 P.2d 821, 825 (Idaho 1984) (restrictions on siting of mobile homes
was legitimate because one of the central purposes of zoning is to “conserve and stabilize
property values”); Mack T. Anderson Ins. Agency, Inc. v. City of Belgrade, 803 P.2d 648, 651
(Mont. 1990) (upholding exclusion of mobile homes from general residential district, citing “a
concern for long-term planning, the unique qualities of manufactured homes, and the property
values of surrounding residents”); Farley v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 636 A.2d 1232, 1238 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993) (“[P]revention of undue concentration of population, prevention of traffic
congestion and maintenance of property values are all legitimate purposes of zoning.”).
Some modern courts refuse to consider property values standing alone as a legitimate
basis for land use controls and require that this be coupled with some other valid consideration.
See, e.g., Redevelopment Auth. of Oil City v. Woodring, 445 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. 1982)
(“[N]either aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values or the stabilization of
economic values in a township are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote the health or the
morals or the safety or the general welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property
owners.”) (quoting Appeal of Medinger, 104 A.2d 118, 122 (Pa. 1954)). Because standards such
as “morals” and “general welfare” are highly subjective, however, courts often consider
diminished property values to be prima facie evidence that some important non-economic value
is being affected. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 75–79 (1966) (courts are not
concerned about property values per se but see property values as a sign that some exogenous
value such as neighborhood character is being impacted). Altogether, this discussion suggests
that courts are somewhat uncomfortable with explicitly permitting homeowners’ economic selfinterest to serve as the basis of municipal land use policies, but nevertheless allow such selfinterest to reign under the more neutral guise of “morals” or “general welfare.”
101. See Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103, 110 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal to rezone
properly based on opposition from neighboring landowners because “[p]roperty owners in the
area who have relied on the existing zoning classification have an interest in the perpetuation of
such scheme unless the public good dictates a change”); State ex rel. Barber & Sons Tobacco Co.
v. Jackson Cnty., 869 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (following Burns for the proposition
that reliance interests of neighbors are a legitimate basis on which to deny a rezone). See also
Dover v. City of Jackson, 541 S.E.2d 92, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding denial of rezone
from residential to commercial, citing, in part, the legitimate governmental interest in preserving
the existing character of the neighborhood); Du Page Trust Co. v. Cnty. of Du Page, 335 N.E.2d
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Modern courts have gone even further than the early decisions in
a few key respects. Where early courts were reluctant to recognize
that aesthetics could be a valid purpose of land use regulations,
modern courts have broadly upheld sweeping aesthetic and historic
preservation laws, often by citing the connection between aesthetic
or historic significance and neighborhood property values. 102 In
addition, where early courts were perhaps willfully oblivious to the
politicization of zoning, many modern courts have explicitly
acknowledged that the local political process is dominated by owners
of developed land who seek to use that process to protect their
reliance interests by preventing new development. Rather than
condemning zoning on these grounds, however, the courts have
accepted that the capture of the local political process by interest
groups intent on using regulation to advance their own self-interest
is a legitimate part of our democratic system.103
A striking example of this judicial approach is the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates,104 authored by one of the most prominent public

61, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (upholding denial of rezone from residential to commercial, citing, in
part, the reliance interests of homeowners in maintaining the residential character of the area).
Similarly, courts have held that reliance interests are a valid basis for distinguishing between
pre-existing uses and prospective uses when formulating new land use regulations. For instance,
in Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected an equal protection challenge against a zoning ordinance that prohibited houseboats
within city limits, but had a grandfather provision for existing houseboats on a particular river.
The court upheld the grandfather provision as a rational means by which to achieve the
legitimate governmental goal of protecting the reliance interests of existing homeowners: “A
state may legitimately use grandfather provisions to protect property owners’ reliance interests.”
Id. at 922. I examine the implications of distinguishing pre-existing from prospective uses
further infra in Part IV.
102. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Mo. 1970)
(acknowledging that protection of property values is valid purpose supporting aesthetic
regulation); Farley v. Graney, 119 S.E.2d 833, 848 (W. Va. 1960) (recognizing ordinance
regulating locations of junk yards appropriate because, inter alia, such uses have “a tendency to
depress neighborhood property values”); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Weiland,
69 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1955) (holding that aesthetic zoning for the purpose of preserving
property values “falls within the exercise of the [state’s] police power . . .” because “[a]nything
that tends to destroy property value . . . “necessarily adversely affects the prosperity, and
therefore the general welfare, of the entire village”).
103. As I explore infra in Part III.B.1, a few courts have considered the parochial nature of
the local political process to justify more searching judicial review, but those cases are in the
minority.
104. 844 F.2d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 1988).
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choice theorists, Judge Richard Posner. In Coniston, a developer
brought a Constitutional due process challenge against a city
council’s denial of the developer’s site plan for a commercial office
building. The court noted that, although the council had given no
reason for the decision, it seemed plausible that the decision was “an
effort to transfer wealth from the plaintiffs” to existing owners of
office space by protecting the existing landowners from
competition. 105 The court nevertheless rebuffed the challenge,
stating that “much governmental action is protectionist or
anticompetitive and nothing is more common in zoning disputes
than selfish opposition to zoning changes.” 106 As the court held:
“The Constitution . . . does not outlaw the characteristic operations
of democratic (or perhaps of any) government, operations which are
permeated by pressure from special interests.” 107
Numerous other decisions have similarly concluded that it is
legitimate for zoning decisions to be rooted in the local
constituency’s desire to protect its pre-existing reliance interests.108
Most of these cases, unlike Coniston, involve homeowners rather than
owners of commercial office buildings. For example, in a decision by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gardner v. City of Baltimore
Mayor, 109 the Court held that the planning commission for the city
of Baltimore was justified in denying approval of a development
105. Id. at 467.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 828–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (“It is not
pernicious per se for a zoning authority to be influenced by political pressure in the
community.”); Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor, 969 F.2d 63, 72 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Those who
live near proposed development have the most significant personal stake in the outcome of landuse decisions and are entitled, under our system of government, to organize and exert whatever
political influence they might have. Nor is it necessarily improper for municipal government to
consider or act upon such political pressure. Such give-and-take between government officials
and an engaged citizenry is what democracy is about.”); Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc.
v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 46 (1st Cir. 1992) (refusal to issue waste disposal permit permissibly
based on local opposition to waste dump siting); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d
1570, 1579 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A] planning commission or a City Council is not a judicial
forum; it is a legislative body held democratically accountable” through the political process.);
Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103, 110 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal to rezone properly based
on opposition from neighboring landowners because “[p]roperty owners in the area who have
relied on the existing zoning classification have an interest in the perpetuation of such scheme
unless the public good dictates a change”).
109. 969 F.2d at 72.
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proposal. The developer argued that it had been deprived of due
process because the planning commission had acted at the behest of
“politically influential residents” 110 who opposed all development
near their neighborhood. The court held, however, that:
Those who live near proposed development have the most
significant personal stake in the outcome of land-use decisions and
are entitled, under our system of government, to organize and exert
whatever political influence they might have. Nor is it necessarily
improper for municipal government to consider or act upon such
political pressure. Such give-and-take between government officials
and an engaged citizenry is what democracy is about. 111

Gardner affirms the central tenet of the public choice model of
local government, which is that homeowners indeed have an
enormous “stake” in land use decisions that induces them to
participate actively in local government. Decisions like Gardner and
Coniston take the next step, however, in holding that landowners
have not only the incentive but also the right to capture the reins of
local government and use them to protect that “stake.”
2. Judicial endorsement of small, suburban municipalities
What has been said so far suggests that courts have played a
fairly passive role, deferring to a local political process that they
acknowledge is captive to homeowners who use that process to
protect their own reliance interests. In fact, courts have taken a
much more active role—they have affirmatively helped to place
homeowners in power in local politics so that homeowners can
protect their own reliance interests without the need for ad hoc
judicial protection. Courts have done this by broadly endorsing state
policies that favor the proliferation of small suburban municipalities
in which homeowners are practically assured of being the dominant
political faction.
As discussed above, the public choice model holds that
homevoters control the local political process because of their
relative size and their enormous incentives to participate in local
112
politics.
Standing alone, though, these characteristics would be
110. Id. at 71.
111. Id. at 72.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 86–94.

987

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/27/2014 10:26 AM

2013

insufficient to bestow homeowners with a reliable degree of political
control. Political scientists have shown that large, diverse cities tend
to be characterized by a “pluralist” governance model in which there
are many sizeable, well-organized, and highly motivated pressure
groups who all exercise some influence with city hall. 113 In a
pluralist system, homeowners might be powerful, but they would
have to share power with groups such as renters, construction firms,
labor unions, and developers, all of whom would likely have more
favorable attitudes toward new development than homeowners.114
The intensity of homeowner interests in particular land use matters
would be counterbalanced by the deep pockets and repeat-player
advantages of developers, or other groups, who could exercise
outsized influence through their ability to make campaign
contributions and to help grow a dwindling urban tax base with new
development.115 And, in a large city, homeowners might not share
uniform interests if they are widely diffused geographically and
would thus feel the impacts of different proposed land use changes
in widely disparate ways. As such, the balance of empirical literature
generally concludes that homeowners exercise considerably less
influence in larger, more diverse cities. 116
In order for homeowners to effectively protect their own reliance
interests by preventing new development, then, it is not enough for

113. See ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, PREFACE]; FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra
note 14, at 328 (“[T]he biggest cities are apt to have pluralistic politics because of their large
population and resulting heterogeneity of interest groups.”); Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions
for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 89 (1998) (noting that with increasing size, cities are
more vulnerable to influence by “rent-seeking groups such as political machines, municipal
unions, public works lobbies, and downtown business interests”).
114. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 90–97 (conceding that
homeowners have far less influence in more diverse urban centers than in smaller suburbs);
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 372–73 (noting that in larger cities,
neighborhood groups cannot control their own zoning because they must share power with
other interests, but smaller suburbs, which are frequently just incorporated neighborhoods, can
zone to protect the neighborhood’s interests).
115. See, e.g., LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 11, at 50–98, 154–62, 230–32. On developers
being repeat players, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 306 (3d ed.
2005).
116. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 115, at 305; FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra
note 14, at 90–92. As I explain infra in Part IV.A, however, there is some evidence emerging that
homeowners are able to exert outsize influence in larger cities as well. For reasons I discuss
there, I am not entirely convinced by this evidence.
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courts to merely defer to the local political process. Rather,
homeowners must have the ability to form a stable political coalition
with other, similarly motivated homeowners that can reliably
dominate the local political process without countervailing pressure
from interest groups with divergent demands—a “majoritarian”
rather than pluralist political system. 117 The best way to accomplish
this is by carving out a small, homogenous municipality comprised
primarily of homeowners who will all be affected in relatively similar
ways by any new land use siting. 118 In such a municipality,
homeowners would exercise tight control over the land use power to
prevent unwanted new development and to maintain the general
homogeneity of the community, such as, for example, by zoning
exclusively for large-lot, single-family homes.119 Furthermore, a
small jurisdiction dominated by homeowners would dilute the
influence of deep-pocketed developers, as campaign contributions
from developers would be less decisive in a small, homogenous
jurisdiction than in a large, diverse one, and the community could
manage its tax base with fiscal zoning rather than by luring bigticket development. 120 Thus, if it were the case that policymakers
and courts desired to provide homeowners with the ability to protect
their own reliance interests through the local political process, we
would expect them to facilitate the proliferation of very small
suburban municipalities dominated by homeowners.
Indeed, that is exactly what has happened. Most states have
enacted a suite of policies that enable and, indeed, encourage the
creation of small, homeowner-dominated suburban municipalities,
and courts, by and large, have been extremely deferential towards
these policies. Courts liberally permit the incorporation of new

117. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 105–07 (contrasting majoritarian
with pluralist political system); id. at 328–29 (small suburbs are majoritarian; large cities are
pluralistic).
118. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriers to the New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2018 (2000) (stating that
“smallness and homogeneity” of suburbs enables them effectively “to wield local powers to
exclude undesirables and pursue the locality’s collective self-interest”).
119. See id.; FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 259–62 (discussing use of
fiscal zoning to ensure homogeneity in small suburbs).
120. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 259–62 (on advantages of fiscal
zoning); id. at 287 (campaign contributions ineffective in small governments).
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municipalities by groups as small as seventy-five individuals 121 and
will typically approve petitions for incorporation as a matter of
course—there is little need for the petitioners to demonstrate that
they represent a cohesive community. 122 As such, areas routinely
incorporate because they prefer to live in a town composed
exclusively of residences or because they wish to seize control of the
land use power to place tight constrictions on new development—
both purposes the courts consider perfectly legitimate. 123 Indeed,
historians have demonstrated that the modern trend toward the
liberalization of incorporation standards—which led to a rash of new
incorporations—coincided with the Supreme Court’s placing its
imprimatur on the constitutionality of zoning. 124 In other words,
communities were incorporating specifically in order to control their
own land use.
Richard Briffault reports that courts have also endorsed a
number of other state policies designed to enable the proliferation of
small suburban communities. Where states have incentivized
incorporation, such as by delegating the zoning power and the ability
to assess property taxes to incorporated communities, courts have
been broadly deferential. 125 And courts have likewise endorsed state
policies designed to facilitate incorporation by minimizing the tax
burden of incorporation, such as the use of special-purpose districts
and interlocal contracting that enable local governments to cheaply
outsource the provision of services such as water, police, or pest
control while retaining local autonomy over the land use and taxing
powers. 126 Finally, courts largely defer to state laws enabling small

121. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 88, at 74.
122. See id. at 75–76 (courts liberally sustain municipal incorporations without regard to
whether the area to be incorporated represents a “community of interest”).
123. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 242–58 (describing
incorporations in Seattle metropolitan region); Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at
361. See also In re Incorporation of Oconomowoc Lake, 97 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Wis. 1959) (“A
community devoted exclusively to residential development and possessing that spirit of
togetherness or that core of community spirit characterized by a unity of action and purpose is a
village in fact within the meaning of the constitution. These villages in fact may only be
concerned with those services necessary for residential community development such as fire and
police protection, zoning and sanitation.”).
124. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 215.
125. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 363–74.
126. See id. at 374–82.
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unincorporated areas to resist annexation to larger communities. 127
As a result of this combination of policies, there are over 19,000
incorporated general-purpose municipalities today, the vast majority
of which are exceptionally small (three-quarters have fewer than
5,000 residents) and primarily composed of homeowners. 128
As Briffault notes, courts see the proliferation of small local
governments “as a healthy development, reflecting an area’s growth
and the democratic desires of its residents.” 129 Small jurisdiction
size is seen as a way of bringing government closer to the people and
enabling them to have tighter control over their governmental
policies. As one court put it, residents of small communities often
prefer to live “relatively free from regulation and have a direct voice
in such municipal matters as zoning or the granting of a liquor
license.” 130 Courts’ abiding concern in boundary change cases
appears to be one of self-determination for smaller local areas. 131
Given that the courts have taken such an active role in assuring
homeowners a reliable degree of political control in suburban
municipalities, it makes sense that they would refrain from providing
direct judicial protection for homeowners’ reliance interests by
awarding them vested rights in existing zoning regulations. Indeed,
it may very well be that the reason courts have given homeowners
the means to protect their own reliance interests through the
political process is to spare themselves the administrative difficulties
of adjudicating homeowners’ reliance claims on an ad hoc basis. In
any event, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that courts have
been very active in facilitating and legitimizing a local political
process in which homeowners have the ability to protect their own
reliance interests.

127. See id. at 361–62.
128. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 88, at 77 (three-quarters of municipalities
have fewer than 5,000 residents); Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 4, at 145 (two-thirds of homes
are owner-occupied, and homeowners vote fifty percent more frequently than renters).
129. Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 88, at 77.
130. Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (upholding statute
permitting smaller cities to annex contiguous portions of larger cities with consent of majority of
residents in area to be annexed).
131. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 838 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Cal.
1992) (“[C]ommunity residents and landowners often prefer to govern their local affairs insofar
as possible, and cityhood provides them with greater opportunities for self-determination than
does residence or ownership in a more amorphous unincorporated area.”).
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3. The primacy of reliance
It could be argued that the courts’ deference to local land use
decision making and state structuring of local governments has less
to do with an affirmative judicial solicitude for reliance interests and
more to do with a general institutional posture of judicial restraint.
Courts subject most legislation—including land use legislation—to
the minimal scrutiny of “rational basis review,” under which laws
require a merely reasonable justification to survive judicial review,
not an especially important or compelling one. 132 And under the
venerable Hunter doctrine, which holds that local governments are
mere creatures of the state, courts are supposed to be especially
deferential toward state decisions regarding the organization of local
133
governments.
In other words, arguably reliance interests are not
so significant as to compel judicial deference; rather, deference is the
court’s default stance, and reliance is simply one of many
rationalizations courts can use to justify that stance.
It is difficult to conclusively answer this potential objection, as
doing so would require an examination of subjective judicial
motivations. Nevertheless, I have reason to suspect that reliance,
rather than a general policy of deference, is driving judicial review in
this area. As an initial matter, the rational basis review to which
courts have long subjected most land use regulation is actually
inconsistent with the legal doctrine governing municipalities. Unlike
states, local government actions are not entitled to a presumption of
legitimacy; according to the well-known Dillon’s Rule, courts are
required to strictly construe any delegation of power from the state
to the local level. 134 Virtually all local governments exercise the land

132. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that most
land use regulations are subject to rational basis review).
133. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (holding that state has broad
power to dictate the terms of municipal boundary change because “[m]unicipal corporations are
political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to them . . . .”); see also Town of Lockport
v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, 430 U.S. 259, 269 (1977) (holding that
states have “wide discretion . . . in forming and allocating governmental tasks to local
subdivisions”).
134. See, e.g., JOHN DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9, at 2122
(1st ed. 1872); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109–13 (1980).
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use power pursuant to a state legislative delegation, which means
that, in principle, courts should be construing the zoning power very
narrowly. Yet, as we have seen, the courts have given local zoning
laws a wide berth. By contrast, courts have often been rather
skeptical of state delegations in other areas. 135 There must be some
reason why courts have quietly violated the spirit of Dillon’s Rule in
land use cases while observing it elsewhere.
Likewise, although the Hunter doctrine commands deference to
state structuring of local governments, a more recent doctrinal line
136
holds that states cannot
beginning with Avery v. Midland County
simply structure local governments however they like but must
conform local governments to constitutional mandates such as the
137
one person/one vote rule.
Courts have, however, disregarded the
one person/one vote rule when it comes to local government
formation—upholding, for example, state policies that permit small
areas to incorporate without obtaining consent from residents of the
138
surrounding area.
The courts have never articulated a persuasive
139
reason for why this deviation from the Avery rule is permissible.
I suspect that the significance of reliance interests explains these
doctrinal inconsistencies. First, as already detailed, courts frequently
135. See, e.g., Olesen v. Town of Hurley, 691 N.W.2d 324 (S.D. 2004) (delegation
permitting municipality to operate a bar did not authorize it to serve food); Arlington Cnty. v.
White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000) (statute authorizing municipalities to provide health benefits
to employees and their dependents did not include authority to define dependents to encompass
same-sex partners).
136. 390 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1968).
137. See also, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Hadley v. Junior
College Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
138. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 838 P.2d 1198, 1200
(Cal. 1992) (holding that state could constitutionally restrict vote on incorporation of new city
to the voters residing within the territory to be incorporated notwithstanding one person/one
vote rule, holding that “the essence of this case is not the fundamental right to vote, but the
state's plenary power to set the conditions under which its political subdivisions are created”); cf.
Lockport, 430 U.S. at 269 (holding that one person/one vote rule is inapplicable to state
structuring of local governments because, per Hunter, states have “wide discretion . . . in
forming and allocating governmental tasks to local subdivisions).
139. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local
Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993) (criticizing inconsistent application of one
person/one vote rule to local governments). As I explain infra at notes 219–25 and
accompanying text, it may be that courts indulge the assumption that local government actions
have no extraterritorial impacts and therefore that residents living outside areas to be
incorporated simply have no interest in the matter. I argue there, however, that this assumption
is highly implausible.
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invoke reliance interests in justifying deference to local land use
decision making and state structuring of local governments. Second,
when courts have gone against the grain of judicial deference and
invalidated local zoning enactments, it has frequently been in order
to protect reliance interests. We have already seen, and will see
further below, how courts will intervene into the political process on
occasion to protect developers’ reliance interests. But courts will also
disturb the political process to protect homeowners’ reliance interests
where courts are convinced that the political process is incapable of
adequately protecting those interests.
I illustrate this point by examining two contexts in which courts
have acted affirmatively to protect homeowners' reliance interests
against an unfavorable political environment: variances and
the extraterritorial impacts of municipal land use regulations. As
shown previously, the local political process usually advantages
homeowners, because of their relative numbers and their extremely
high degree of motivation to be active in local government. For this
reason, I have argued, courts will usually defer to the political
process so that homeowners can protect their own reliance interests.
On occasion, however, that process can work to the disadvantage of
homeowners. For instance, while many land use decisions (such as
rezonings) are made by elected city officials, who are accountable to
the demands of their constituents, some land use decisions are made
by unelected administrative bodies which are not so accountable.
Thus, requests for a variance (an application by a developer to
deviate from the strict requirements of a zoning ordinance because
of a hardship), are typically adjudicated by an appointed body such
as a zoning board of adjustment. 140 Because the zoning board is
insulated from the political pressure of homeowners, there is a risk
that the board will grant variances without regard to homeowners’
reliance interests in the pre-existing zoning scheme. 141 Perhaps for

140. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 115, at 286–96 (discussing variances).
141. Studies have demonstrated that zoning boards approve an extremely high number of
variance requests. See, e.g., id. at 294–95 (collecting studies).
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this reason, courts apply stricter judicial review to the granting of
variances than to rezonings and other legislative decisions. 142
This reasoning is made explicit in Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic
Community v. County of Los Angeles. 143 There, the California Supreme
Court set forth rigorous standards for the judiciary to apply in
reviewing municipal decisions regarding the approval of variances.
The court reasoned that “the membership of some zoning boards
may be inadequately insulated from the interests whose advocates
most frequently seek variances.” 144 In other words, because
developers are likely to be repeat players before zoning boards, (and
because there is no countervailing political pressure from
homeowners) there is a serious risk that zoning boards will be
biased in favor of developers. Accordingly, the Topanga court stated,
strict judicial scrutiny is necessary
in order to protect the interests of those who hold rights in
property nearby the parcel for which a variance is sought. A zoning
scheme, after all, is similar in some respects to a contract; each
party foregoes rights to use its land as it wishes in return for the
assurance that the use of neighboring property will be similarly
restricted, the rationale being that such mutual restriction can
enhance total community welfare. If the interest of these parties in
preventing unjustified variance awards for neighboring land is not
sufficiently protected, the consequence will be subversion of the
critical reciprocity upon which zoning regulation rests. 145

Thus, although courts normally defer to municipal land use
decision making because they trust the local political process to
adequately protect homeowners’ reliance interests, here the court
deviates from its usual posture of deference and applies vigorous
judicial review because it lacks the confidence that the zoning board
will protect those reliance interests.

142. See, e.g., Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Summers, 814 So. 2d 851, 855 (Ala. 2001) (“We
have repeatedly recognized that variances should be granted sparingly, and only under unusual
and exceptional circumstances . . . .”); Valley View Civic Ass’n. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983) (“The reasons for granting a variance must be substantial, serious
and compelling.”). I address further infra in Part III.B.1. the broad distinction courts make
between legislative and quasi-judicial decision making.
143. 522 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1974).
144. Id. at 19.
145. Id. (citations omitted).
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Another context in which courts apply heightened judicial
scrutiny to protect homeowners’ reliance interests from an
inadequate political process is the extraterritorial impact of
municipal land use decisions. As we have seen, often a land use
siting or rezoning will affect property values of nearby homeowners.
This is what gives homeowners an incentive to lobby city hall to
prevent unwanted sitings or land use changes. Some of the affected
homeowners, however, may not actually live in the municipality
making the land use decision—they may live just across the border
in a neighboring town. Because voting rights are apportioned based
on residence, however, these homeowners have no political power
146
Hence, the local
with which to influence the land use decision.
political process may neglect their reliance interests. Accordingly,
courts typically hold that municipalities are required to consider the
interests of such homeowners before making a land use decision. 147
For instance, in Scott v. City of Indian Wells,148 the California Supreme
Court held that a municipality was required to provide notice and an
opportunity to be heard regarding the authorization of a new
development near the municipality’s borders to owners of real
property situated just outside the borders of a municipality whose
property values stood to be affected by the proposed development.
The court held that the landowners in question had a sufficient
property interest to state a due process claim because “it is clear that
the development of a parcel on the city’s edge will substantially
affect the value and usability of an adjacent parcel on the other side

146. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 38, at 440 (most municipalities accord
voting rights only to residents).
147. See, e.g., Borough of Creskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d 441, 445–46 (N.J. 1954)
(“At the very least Dumont owes a duty to hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoining
municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much
consideration to their rights as they would to those of residents and taxpayers of Dumont.”); see
also Brd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. City of Thornton, 629 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1981) (homeowners have
standing to bring suit against neighboring town challenging land use decision that affects
plaintiffs’ property values); Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (same);
Wittingham v. Woodridge, 249 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (same); Koppel v. City of
Fairway, 371 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1962) (same); Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 117 A.2d 86 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1955) (same). I discuss these decisions further infra at note 222.
148. 492 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Cal. 1972).
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of the municipal line.” 149 The court’s intervention was necessary
here because the municipality had no political incentive to consider
the impacts of its land use decisions on the reliance interests of
homeowners who lacked voting rights there.
We can thus fairly conclude that judicial review of land use
decision making is strongly motivated by a desire to protect
homeowners’ reliance interests. This explains both why courts
typically defer to a political process that tends to advantage
homeowners (despite a doctrinal rule apparently requiring
heightened judicial review of land use regulation), and why courts
will occasionally intervene in the political process to protect
homeowners’ reliance interests where they perceive that the political
process is inadequate to do so. 150

B. Developers as “Discrete and Insular Minorities”
Although the foregoing explains why, under the public choice
model, courts would facilitate a local political process dominated by
homevoters, the public choice model also cautions courts to be wary
about such a political process. It has been a staple of public choice
theory ever since Madison’s famous Federalist No. 10 that small polities
are subject to capture by self-interested “factions,” which may then
use their control over the polity to exploit vulnerable minorities for
their own gain. 151 Madison, ever the pragmatist, saw the solution to
this problem not in eliminating faction itself, but in enlarging the size
of the jurisdiction so that factions would neutralize each other’s
influence and no particular faction could persistently dominate the
political process. 152 Madison’s intuition has been confirmed in recent
decades by political scientists such as Robert Dahl, who have
demonstrated that urban politics in many large cities does indeed
149. Id. at 1141.
150. I am grateful to Richard Norton for urging me to consider courts’ generally deferential
posture toward legislation as an alternative explanation of the pattern described in this paper.
151. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra
note 14, at 104–07 (Madison was concerned about majoritarian exploitation in small republics
such as local governments).
152. THE FEDERALIST was, of course, largely a propaganda piece designed to advocate for
the more centralized form of government created by the new Constitution.
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follow a pluralist kind of governance model in which shifting
coalitions form and unform, and “minorities rule.” 153
Ironically, as we have just seen, the very reason why homeowners
have sought refuge in small suburban municipalities has been to escape
the interest-group pluralism of diverse cities so that they can exercise
direct control over their own government without the need to engage in
messy coalition-forming. These small suburbs, then, are exactly the sort
of polities Madison was concerned about, in which a stable majority can
exploit a weaker minority.154 Indeed, Fischel argues that because of
homeowners’ dominant position within local politics, and their
motivation to use the political process to prevent most new
development, developers are placed at a fairly consistent disadvantage in
the local political process.155 Homeowners tend to be skeptical of most
new development because they worry that it may entail negative
impacts such as noise, congestion, traffic, diminution in quality of life,
and of course, a decline in property values.156 Any given development
project thus pits “a large and well-organized group of homeowners
against a single prodevelopment landowner.” 157 Assuming the project
requires some kind of land use approval from the municipality (which it
virtually always does in an era of ubiquitous land use regulations), the
developer will face a distinct disadvantage attempting to influence the
municipal authorities against this large and well-organized adversary.
Accordingly, Fischel argues that courts should use more vigorous
judicial review when assessing claims by developers against local
government land use practices than when assessing claims by

153. See DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 113, at 133; Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors
Empower Weak Cities, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2550–55 (2006) (arguing the modern cities are still
characterized by “significant pluralism”); supra text accompanying notes 112–16.
154. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Use Controls as a Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 853–57 (1983) (noting that local governments are
suspect under Madison’s model).
155. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 4–5 (Suburban politics pit “a
large and well-organized group of existing homeowners against a single prodevelopment
landowner, who may not even be a resident. . . . [T]he political process is skewed against [the
developer].”); FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 15–16 (arguing that
homeowners are the dominant faction in small, suburban communities and use zoning controls
to protect their own wealth; developers are largely “supplicants”).
156. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4–12, 72–93; sources cited
supra note 8 (discussing various land use conflicts involving NIMBYs (“Not in my backyard”)).
157. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 4–5.
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homeowners. 158 The homeowner, who has political power, can use
the legislative process to protect her own interests, whereas the
landowner without such power can only repair to the judiciary. In
making this case, Fischel draws on a rich body of public choice
literature that argues, by and large, that courts should use judicial
review to ensure free and fair access to the political process, and
should be particularly alert where those aggrieved by a legislative act
are “discrete and insular minorities” who are vulnerable to
consistent exploitation by a majoritarian political process. 159 Fischel
argues that developers should be considered the equivalent of a
discrete and insular minority because they are likely to be
consistently victimized by antidevelopment homeowners in small
suburban municipalities. Isolated and voteless, facing off against “a
large and well-organized group of homeowners,” the developer
stands little chance of influencing the local political process. 160
To what extent have the courts taken this public choice critique
to heart? As noted earlier, courts are undoubtedly aware of the fact
that the local political process in many communities is controlled by
homeowners. We have seen, though, that courts nevertheless tend to
be highly deferential to local land use decision making. In some
circumstances, however, courts do recognize that developers are
likely to be vulnerable in local politics and will depart from their
usual deferential standard in order to protect developers against
majoritarian exploitation. For instance, as Part III.B.1 below
demonstrates, some courts have protected developers by applying
heightened scrutiny to certain land use regulations, labeled “quasijudicial” or “adjudicative,” that disproportionately impact particular
landowners, while acknowledging that broad deference is
appropriate for “legislative” acts that impact the public more
generally. This distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial acts

158. See id. at 4–5, 114–40.
159. See id. at 114–40. Fischel draws on classic works such as JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–179 (1980) and Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165, 1217–18 (1967). See supra notes 64 & 80 (discussing these sources).
160. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 136–37 (discussing how
majoritarian political process, such as that present in small suburban communities, gives rise to
suspicion of exploitation of discrete and insular minorities much more readily than in a
“pluralistic” political process).
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appears to reflect the public choice logic that courts should more
closely review regulations that affect isolated, disorganized groups
than those that affect larger, well-organized groups.
Ultimately, however, most courts have declined to apply the
“quasi-judicial” label broadly so as to protect developers against a
majoritarian political process. While this may appear to show that
courts do not follow a public choice understanding of the political
process, in Part III.B.2 I argue that courts’ rejection of a broad use of
the quasi-judicial standard is actually quite consistent with the
public choice account. Under that account, heightened scrutiny for
adjudicative decisions is largely unnecessary to protect developers
because developers can prevent majoritarian exploitation to the
extent they can simply exit one jurisdiction and seek a friendly
regulatory environment elsewhere—an ability made all the easier by
the proliferation of small municipalities within particular
metropolitan areas. Thus, while developers do not require the
heightened protections of a quasi-judicial proceeding, they do require
protection in circumstances where they cannot easily exit a
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, exiting a jurisdiction should be easy, because
developers usually have the ability to diversify their risk across
numerous projects in different jurisdictions. However, once a
developer has sunk substantial resources into a particular project,
exit becomes very costly. Thus, courts will intervene to protect a
developer under circumstances where she has demonstrated
significant reliance interests. Once again, reliance proves to be a
central concern in judicial review of municipal land use regulations.

1. The legislative/quasi-judicial distinction: protection for developers?
A long-standing doctrine of administrative law holds that courts
should defer to “legislative” acts that broadly affect the public at
large, but apply stricter scrutiny to “quasi-judicial” acts that
disproportionately affect particular individuals. 161 As Saul Levmore
notes, the heightened scrutiny for quasi-judicial as opposed to

161. Compare Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (requiring notice and
opportunity to be heard where administrative process disproportionately affected few
landowners) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)
(dispensing with requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard where administrative action
affected the public generally).
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legislative matters reflects the underlying public choice logic
162
discussed here.
Specifically, where regulation disproportionately
harms an isolated individual or small group, the affected party is
unlikely to be capable of organizing to influence the political process
so as to obtain relief from the regulation; by contrast, when
regulation broadly impacts a larger class, that class can more easily
organize into an interest group and influence the political process so
as to protect itself against the harmful regulation. Therefore,
consistent with the public choice view of judicial review, courts
apply greater scrutiny to the former kind of regulation than the
latter. 163 Levmore notes that the divide between quasi-judicial and
legislative acts closely resembles the divide in takings law between a
physical occupation and a regulation that broadly affects property
values (recall the condemnation blight scenario discussed in the
Lucas case).164 Because a physical occupation is more likely to affect
isolated, individual landowners who are politically powerless,
whereas a regulation tends to affect a large group that is capable of
organizing, the former is considered a compensable taking while the
latter is not. Levmore argues accordingly that the courts are more
concerned with group size and organizational ability than with
reliance per se. 165
On the surface, there is some evidence to support Levmore’s
view. Historically, most land use decisions were considered
legislative in character unless they were plainly individualized
administrative matters, such as an application for a variance or a
special use permit. In the early 1970s, however, a number of courts
undertook to broaden the scope of the “quasi-judicial” label to cover
matters such as small-scale rezoning requests. 166 One of the more

162. See Levmore, supra note 14, at 307 & n.51.
163. Id. Carol Rose likewise argues that the application of the quasi-judicial standard to
municipal land use decisions reflects the traditional Madisonian concern that a majority
“faction” may exploit vulnerable minorities. See Rose, supra note 154, at 851–57.
164. See Levmore, supra note 14, at 307 & n.51.
165. Levmore explicitly rejects that the Court’s takings jurisprudence centers on the
protection of reliance interests. See id. at 317–18 & n.74. He argues that takings law is more
fruitfully explained by the distinction between larger, well-organized groups and smaller,
isolated groups. See id.
166. This approach has come to be known as the “Fasano doctrine,” after Fasano v. Bd. of
Cnty. Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), the leading case applying the quasi-judicial
standard to small-scale rezonings.
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notable cases to take this approach, Snyder v. Board of County
Commissioners of Brevard County,167 argued that it was necessary to
treat small-scale rezonings as quasi-judicial in order to protect the
isolated developers who typically seek such relief from a political
process controlled by organized homeowners who are predisposed to
oppose rezoning requests. In Snyder, a developer sought to have a
one-half acre parcel rezoned from General Use (a very low-density
zoning classification) to a medium-density, multi-family dwelling
classification so that he could erect multi-family housing on the
parcel. 168 The proposed rezoning was not anticipated to cause any
significant environmental impacts and was consistent with the
county’s comprehensive plan, and as such the county’s appointed
Planning and Zoning Board recommended that the rezoning be
approved. 169 Nevertheless, the elected county Board of
Commissioners overruled the Planning and Zoning Board and denied
the rezoning, without providing any reasons for its decision. 170 The
court held that this sort of small-scale rezoning was quasi-judicial in
character and thus required the Board to state reasons for its
decisions and make findings of fact that would facilitate close judicial
scrutiny.171
The court determined that applying these quasi-judicial
standards was necessary in order to protect developers against a
political process stacked in favor of anti-development homeowners.
The court noted that rezoning decisions are often made based “not
solely on the basis of the land’s suitability to the new zoning
classification and compatibility with the use of surrounding acreage,
but, also, and perhaps foremost, on local political considerations.” 172
Chief among the relevant “local political considerations,” the court
observed, was the desire of existing homeowners to maintain the
value of their own land by preventing new development. 173 Because
homeowners’ political opposition interferes with a developer’s
“constitutional right to use his vacant property or make a more
167. Snyder v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brevard, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

rev’d in part, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
168. See id.
169. See id. at 67.
170. See id. at 67–68.
171. See id. at 78–82.
172. Id. at 73.
173. See id. at 73–74.
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intense use of his underzoned land,” 174 the court held that the
developer was entitled to the protections of a quasi-judicial
proceeding before his request for a rezoning could be denied.
Snyder appears to affirm Levmore’s view that the judicial process
appropriately focuses not on reliance per se, but more broadly on
circumstances in which an isolated individual or group is likely to be
exploited by well-organized interests. 175 In Snyder, indeed, there was
no evidence that the plaintiff developer had any protectable reliance
interests—he had purchased the parcel in question while it was
zoned for a restrictive zoning classification in which his proposed
development was prohibited, and there is nothing in the record to
suggest that he had received any assurances that his request for a
site-specific rezoning would be granted.
Snyder, however, is an outlier. Most courts resist treating sitespecific rezonings as quasi-judicial, opting instead to treat almost all
rezonings as legislative in character. 176 In many of these cases,
courts explicitly acknowledge the political dominance of
homeowners in the local political process and the isolation of the
individual developer, but nevertheless hold that homeowners are
entitled to use the political process to their advantage regardless of
the impact on the isolated developer. 177 The most glaring
counterpoint to Snyder, though involving owners of commercial
property rather than homeowners, is Coniston Corp. v. Village of
Hoffman Estates.178 As discussed previously, Coniston upheld a local
government’s refusal to approve a site plan for development of a

174. Id. at 73.
175. A somewhat similar case is Kennedy v. Upper Milford Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 834
A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2003). There, the court held that the local zoning hearing board did not violate
state “Sunshine Laws” by deliberating privately regarding a developer’s application for a variance
that would permit raising the height of a cell phone tower. The court reasoned that the zoning
hearing board was a quasi-adjudicative body and, as such, private deliberations were appropriate
in order to ensure that the board was insulated from the “emotional rancor” that often
surrounds such decision. See id. at 1117.
176. See, e.g., Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 21 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2001); Arnel v. City
of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1980); SELMI ET AL., supra note 15, at 267 (“Most states . . .
have rejected the Fasano doctrine and continue to treat all rezonings as legislative in nature.”).
177. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 828–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (denying
request for site-specific rezoning appropriately based on political pressure from homeowners
who opposed rezoning; stating that “[i]t is not pernicious per se for a zoning authority to be
influenced by political pressure in the community”); see also cases cited supra note 108.
178. 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988).
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small tract of land, even after acknowledging that the decision could
plausibly be described as “an effort to transfer wealth from the
plaintiffs” to existing landowners by protecting landowners from
competition by the plaintiffs. 179 Parenthetically, the court took note
of the public choice view that the legislative/quasi-judicial
distinction hinges on the size of the affected class, and stated that
“[t]he class here is small. This might support an argument that some
type of individualized hearing was required.” 180 Nevertheless, the
court shrugged off this argument and held that the action was
legislative in character, stating that “the check on [the legislative
authority’s] behavior is purely electoral, but . . . in a democratic
polity this method of checking official action cannot be dismissed as
inadequate per se.” 181
Several other courts have followed Coniston’s lead and refused to
apply heightened scrutiny in cases where developers have lost out in
the political process as a result of the apparent dominance of
182
homevoters.
Moreover, as we have seen before, many courts who
do apply heightened scrutiny to individualized land use decisions are
motivated by exactly the opposite concern that drove Snyder: they
worry that where individualized as opposed to broadly applicable
land use regulations are involved, the developer is likely to have too
much influence with regulatory authorities.183 For these courts,
heightened scrutiny of individualized land use decisions is necessary
to protect homeowners—and specifically homeowners’ reliance
interests—from an antidemocratic decision-making process that
disregards their interests. These cases support my argument that
what is really driving the judiciary is not a stylized distinction
between large, organized groups and isolated, individual landowners,

179. Id. at 467.
180. Id. at 469.
181. Id.
182. See cases cited supra note 108.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 140–50; see also Fasano v. Bd. of Cnty.
Commisioners, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or. 1973) (holding that developer’s request for small-scale
rezoning must be considered quasi-judicial because of the “dangers of the almost irresistible
pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on local government”). Although
Fasano was significantly revised, and arguably overruled, by the subsequent case of Neuberger v.
City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980), it was later cited as persuasive authority by Snyder,
even though its view about the relative power of developers in the local political process is
precisely the opposite of Snyder’s.
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as Levmore suggests, but rather the desire to protect reliance
interests where the political process is inadequate to protect those
interests. I pursue that theme further in the following section.

2. The Tiebout model and the significance of reliance
Given the courts’ general refusal to provide isolated developers
with heightened judicial protection against a local political process
dominated by homeowners, can we conclude that courts are
insensitive to the public choice model of local government and
unconcerned about the exploitation of “discrete and insular”
minorities by a majoritarian faction? Not necessarily. Public choice
theorists have long noted that there is a built-in safety valve against
majoritarian exploitation of minority interests in small local
governments: the ability of exploited minorities to simply flee the
jurisdiction. Ever since a path breaking article in 1956 by economist
Charles Tiebout, 184 it has been a staple of public choice theory that
where a given metropolitan region features a critical mass of local
governments, individuals possess the ability to “vote with their feet”
by choosing to locate in the jurisdiction they find most attractive. 185
Empirical studies have largely confirmed that such foot-voting does
indeed take place.186 The mobility of urban constituents works to
discipline local governments: if municipalities choose to adopt
policies such as redistributive taxes or oppressive land use policies,
they pay for that mistake by losing their markets. 187 Thus, the threat
of exit is a counterpoint to the Madisonian problem of majoritarian
exploitation: where a jurisdiction is very small, it may indeed enable
a particular faction to dominate, but small jurisdiction size will also
tend to make exit relatively easy, provided that there is a catholicity

184. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
185. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506–28 (1991) (reviewing public
choice model and evidence supporting it); Rose, supra note 154, at 882–87 (arguing that
possibility of exit is a means of legitimizing local government).
186. See Been, supra note 185, at 506–28 (reviewing evidence).
187. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 277 (“The chief discipline on
local government majoritarianism is mobility.”); Been, supra note 185, at 506–28 (indicating that
Tiebout model suggests that competition among jurisdictions for mobile residents and revenue
will constrain opportunistic behavior by government officials).
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of other small jurisdictions in the same metropolitan region. 188
Those who have “chosen” to stay in a particular jurisdiction with
exploitative regulations by not exiting have presumptively consented
to be governed by those regulations, and thus courts need not
intervene.189
The “Tiebout model” suggests, accordingly, that judicial review
of municipal land use regulations should largely be confined to
circumstances where a party is incapable of exiting a jurisdiction
except at great cost. Ordinarily, as just mentioned, the implicit threat
of exit is sufficient to prevent local governments from exploiting
discrete and insular minorities. Once that threat is removed,
however, local governments have a free hand to take advantage of
vulnerable parties.
This, at long last, explains why courts are so solicitous of
developers’ reliance interests. Where a developer has invested little
in a particular project, exit is relatively cheap. Many developers, of
course, are not residents or stakeholders of any particular
community but simply businesspeople who will locate in whatever
municipality offers the best return on their investment. 190 Thus, if a
developer has optioned a piece of real property in a particular
municipality with the intent to develop it, and the municipality
subsequently makes clear that the approval process is going to be a
difficult one, the developer can abandon the investment with nothing
lost beyond the price of the option. 191 Furthermore, a developer may
invest simultaneously in numerous projects in different jurisdictions
in order to hedge against the possibility of an unfavorable regulatory
environment in any particular municipality. Given all this, municipal
authorities are likely to refrain from placing overly burdensome
regulatory hurdles upon the developer precisely because they are
aware of how easily the developer can leave town. However, once a
developer has begun making substantial investments in a specific
project, the cost of exit rises dramatically. The municipality now has

188. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 289–324 (arguing that threat of
exit can prevent exploitation of “discrete and insular” minorities).
189. See id. at 277 (judicial intervention unnecessary where mobility is easy).
190. Cf. Been, supra note 185, at 509–11 (discussing numerous options developer can
exercise when dissatisfied with municipal regulatory regime).
191. See id. at 511–13 (noting widespread municipal awareness of developers’ ability to
option land and thus to easily exit jurisdiction).
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less of an incentive to maintain a favorable regulatory environment
for the developer. In addition, the implicit logic of the Tiebout
model—that a party has constructively consented to a jurisdiction’s
oppressive regulations by choosing to do business there—is
undermined if the oppressive regulations are not actually in place at
the time the developer opts to plant firm roots in the jurisdiction,
but are only adopted after the developer’s exit costs have dramatically
increased. The Tiebout model presupposes that regulation will be
reasonably transparent and predictable so that parties can make an
informed decision to vote with their feet.192 Thus, if the Tiebout
model is accepted, it makes sense that courts would seek to protect
developers’ reliance interests in circumstances where their exit costs
are sufficiently high that they cannot readily escape majoritarian
exploitation. 193
This observation returns us to our starting point: why do courts
protect developers’ reliance interests and not those of homeowners?
After all, the homeowner has the same problem as the developer
with the sunk costs: she has invested so much in a single asset in
192. See Rose, supra note 154, at 903–10 (arguing that “exit model” requires
predictability).
193. Vicki Been argues that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence restricting the ability of
municipalities to extract concessions from developers in exchange for regulatory permits (the
“exactions” jurisprudence) is inconsistent with the Tiebout exit model because the Court
presumes that developers seeking regulatory permits are vulnerable to “extortion” by
municipalities with a monopoly on the permitting power. Been, supra note 185; see Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). According to Been, developers are
not vulnerable to extortion where municipalities must be sensitive to interlocal competition and
are presumptively aware of the ease with which developers can forego an investment
opportunity in one locality for a better opportunity in a neighboring town. See Been, supra note
185. Nevertheless, these cases need not necessarily be read as inconsistent with the Tiebout
model. The earlier two cases, Nollan and Dolan, involved landowners who were not developers
but merely wanted to expand the existing use of their property. Arguably, then, their reliance
interests and exit costs were high. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 344–45
(arguing that Nollan implicated landowner’s reliance interests). The recently decided Koontz case
is harder to square with the Tiebout model because it involved a developer who wanted to build
on vacant land and the record revealed no evidence of any significant reliance interests.
However, as Justice Kagan noted in dissent, Koontz leaves open the question of whether it
applies only to exactions imposed on an ad hoc basis or if it also includes exactions that are
generally applicable. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Ehrlich v. Culver
City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996)). As ad hoc exactions would make the issuance of regulatory
permits unpredictable, whereas generally applicable exactions afford predictability to developers,
subjecting the former but not the latter to the exactions doctrine would respect developers’
reliance interests. It remains to be seen what the long-term implications of Koontz will be.
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reliance on the pre-existing zoning that exiting the jurisdiction after
an adverse zoning change can only be accomplished at great expense
(loss of equity, depreciated credit rating, and a possible deficiency
judgment). There is a crucial difference, however, between
developers and homeowners. As just explained, the high cost of exit
caused by the incurrence of substantial reliance interests renders
developers exceptionally vulnerable in the local political process. But
the difficulty of exiting is precisely what enables homeowners to be
so dominant within that political process. As we have already seen,
homeowners’ stake in the outcome of land use decisions gives them
a strong incentive to organize and influence local government,
because they do not have the freedom to simply exit when they
dislike the regulatory regime. 194 Indeed, we recall that one of the
central reasons why the federal government has sought to incentivize
homeownership over the past century has been to induce Americans
to be politically active by giving them a stake in governmental
affairs. 195 Studies have confirmed that homeowners tend to be far
more active in local politics than renters, likely because homeowners
face much greater barriers to exit that force them to exercise their
voice in local government. 196
Thus, the fact that reliance makes exit difficult provides a public
choice explanation for both why developers are likely to be exploited
in the local political process and why homeowners/neighbors are
likely to be dominant in that same process, which likewise explains
why courts generally provide judicial protection for developers’
reliance interests while declining to provide similar protection for
neighbors’ reliance interests. In conclusion, it appears that reliance is
194. See supra text accompanying notes 89–94. Drawing on Albert Hirschmann’s path
breaking work EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970), Fischel, Rose, and other theorists argue that
one alternative to exit is staying within the municipality and exercising one’s “voice.” See
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 72–76; FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra
note 14, at 289–324; Rose, supra note 154, at 883–87. Indeed, according to Fischel, it is precisely
the inability to exit that requires homeowners to stay “loyal” and exercise their “voice.” See
FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 72–76.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 51–52. Rose mentions that lighting out to the
frontier is a long-standing American tradition that legitimizes the notion of exit. See Rose, supra
note 154, at 886. As I have mentioned supra, however, there is an equally strong tradition of
encouraging Americans to plant firm roots in their communities, perhaps apotheosized by the
efforts of policymakers like Herbert Hoover to encourage homeownership. This tension between
“exit” and “voice” provides much of the underlying dynamics of local land use decision making.
196. See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 80–81.
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at the core of the judicial approach to the land use decision making
process. The primacy of reliance interests explains courts’ general
policy of deferring to municipal land use regulations and state
policies regarding municipal boundary change, their rejection of
heightened procedural protections for developers in most
circumstances where some evidence of reliance is not present, and
their solicitude for developers’ reliance interests where developers
have made substantial expenditures based on some site-specific
regulation. 197
In the remaining Part, I offer two critiques of the public choice
account. The first assails its descriptive premise about homeowner
control of the local political process, arguing that in fact the local
political process is far more complex than the public choice account
admits. The second, more fundamental critique is normative in
nature. The public choice account so fetishizes reliance interests that
it fails to give sufficient regard to equally weighty interests in land
use decision making. In the ultimate analysis, furthermore, the
lionization of reliance interests proves self-defeating even on its own
terms.
IV. CRITIQUING THE PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL

A. Descriptive Critique: What About Big Cities?
A major presumption of the public choice account, of course, is
that homeowners represent the dominant faction in local politics and
that developers therefore constitute a vulnerable, isolated minority.
197. As I have argued here that courts are driven by a public choice understanding of how
municipalities operate, I should note that there is also a public choice theory of how courts
operate. Einer Elhauge argues, for example, that courts, like legislatures, are likely to be overly
influenced by parties who can most effectively organize, because organization enables effective
litigation efforts just as it does effective lobbying efforts. See Elhauge, supra note 90, at 66–71. It
is not clear how much this matters in the context of land use litigation, however, which Elhauge
does not discuss specifically. What tends to give homeowners the advantage in most small,
suburban municipalities is not natural organizing ability but a political process in which
homeowners are the dominant faction. I argue below that in larger, more diverse municipalities,
developers are likely to be more influential because of their deep pockets and repeat-player
advantages. These factors would seemingly give developers significant influence in the litigation
process as well, but that influence may be counteracted by the ability of the municipalities
defending land use restrictions to call upon the support of powerful and well-funded
associations of municipal governments who seek to avoid an adverse precedent. I thank David
Schleicher for directing me to consider the public choice theory of litigation.

1009

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/27/2014 10:26 AM

2013

However, as we have already seen, this premise is generally only true
of small suburban municipalities, not larger cities. Larger cities are
believed to follow a “pluralist” model of governance in which
developers exercise a considerable degree of political influence and
198
homeowners are less powerful.
Indeed, many theorists argue that
cities are actually beholden to a “growth machine” that seeks to
pursue heedless development regardless of the consequences to
existing homeowners. 199 It is for this reason, as we have seen, that
many homeowners have fled big cities and lighted out to smaller
“majoritarian” municipalities in which they can call the shots. 200
This observation suggests that courts should reverse their
traditional approach when dealing with large cities: provide less
judicial protection for developers and more protection for
homeowners. 201 The courts, however, have taken a one-size-fits-all

198. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16.
199. See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 11, at 50–98 (articulating growth machine thesis).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 117–31. In recent years, some scholars have
challenged the “growth machine” thesis. David Schleicher, for example, argues that the political
structuring of most big cities actually favors NIMBY homeowners who desire to prevent new
growth. Specifically, Schleicher argues that the formally nonpartisan nature of local elections
disables city councils from forming alliances based on party allegiance, and thus councils simply
defer to individual councilmembers to decide issues pertinent to the geographic districts they
represent. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 Yale L.J. 1670, 1703, 1709–10 (2013). And
because development brings diffuse citywide benefits while concentrating costs in one
geographic area, councilmembers are predisposed to oppose new development in their own
wards. See id. To the extent this is a general argument about how cities function, I find it
unconvincing. Schleicher’s theory presupposes that city councils are all ward-based systems in
which councilmembers represent specific geographic districts. This may be true of older, rustbelt
cities, but most cities today, especially in the fast-growing Sunbelt, feature “at-large” electoral
systems in which councilmembers do not represent individual geographic districts but are
elected citywide. See ROBERT E. LANG & JENNIFER B. LEFURGY, BOOMBURBS: THE RISE OF
AMERICA’S ACCIDENTAL CITIES 121–24 (2007) (reporting that virtually all of the large and
increasingly diverse suburban cities in the Sunbelt, dubbed “boomburbs” by the authors, use atlarge voting systems); JAMES H. SVARA, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, A SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CITY
COUNCILS 25 (1991) (reporting that nationwide, 42.6% of cities use at-large elections, 29.1% use
district elections, and the remaining 28.2% use mixed systems in which some seats are elected
by district and others at-large). In these cities, the growth machine appears to still be
predominant. See generally LANG & LEFURGY, supra, at 123–24 (arguing that the “growth
machine” is dominant in boomburb municipalities). For a discussion of the consequences of atlarge voting structures on land use conflicts in the southwest, see Kenneth A. Stahl, The Artifice
of Local Growth Politics: At-Large Elections, Ballot-Box Zoning, and Judicial Review, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 1 (2010).
201. Cf. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 14, at 328 (advocating more judicial
deference to land use decisions in large cities because of pluralistic decision making process).
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approach to local governments that treats all general-purpose
municipalities as formally equivalent, regardless of size or diversity.
Courts have given no indication that the nature of judicial review is
contingent upon whether a particular municipality has a “pluralist”
or “majoritarian” political process. Perhaps courts believe they lack
the institutional competence to make the fine distinction between
“pluralism” and “majoritarianism,” or they desire to avoid the
administrative difficulties of applying these labels on an ad hoc basis.
It is understandable that courts would decline to engage in amateur
political science, but if they do so, we cannot then rest a theory of
judicial review on blanket assumptions about what groups are likely
to exploit or be exploited in local politics. In short, the public choice
model rests on a questionable empirical premise that courts are
unwilling to question.

B. Normative Critique: Reliance Distorts Land Use Decision Making
The normative problem with the public choice account is that
the courts’ single-minded focus on the protection of reliance
interests causes important competing concerns to be shortchanged
in the land use decision making process. Under the public choice
model, existing residents have an enormous incentive to either keep
out most new housing or to drastically increase the cost of new
202
housing through burdensome regulatory hurdles.
This means
that, for the sake of protecting existing residents’ reliance interests,
prospective residents of these communities will either be wholly
excluded or forced to pay a steep admission fee in order to settle
there. As I demonstrate below, this simple dichotomy between
existing and prospective residents has been a major contributor to
203
racial and income segregation in most metropolitan regions.
202. See, e.g., FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 14, at 4–12, 72–93; Richard
Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1824, 1829 (2003) (explaining how
homeowner-dominated jurisdictions use zoning to restrict the supply of housing so as to
increase their own property values).
203. There are other equally significant costs to the courts’ fetishization of reliance
interests. For instance, it can cause inefficiencies in land use sitings, because homeowners’
resistance to land uses such as multi-family housing, gas stations, or waste facilities makes it
difficult to find suitable sites for these regionally necessary but locally undesirable land uses
(often called LULUS). See, e.g., Been, supra note 185, at 788–90 (“The siting of LULUs . . . has
become an extraordinarily difficult public policy challenge.”). Likewise, giving so much weight to
homeowners’ reliance interests can promote wasteful urban sprawl, because developers can only
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Courts have sidestepped this problem, however, by simply denying
the causal relationship between reliance interests and segregation. In
doing so, however, they have tipped their hand that the entire
judicial enterprise of protecting reliance interests is fruitless.

1. Prospective vs. existing residents and the problem of interlocal segregation
When courts have directly confronted the conflict between
existing residents’ reliance interests and prospective residents’
demand for affordable housing, they have unabashedly sided with
the former by invoking the underlying premises of the public choice
model. In Nordlinger v. Hahn, 204 for example, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 13, a
controversial ballot initiative that imposes strict limits on property
tax assessments for existing landowners but lifts those restrictions
upon a change in ownership. As the Court noted, Proposition 13 is
widely described as embracing a “Welcome, stranger” model in
which newer homeowners are expected to bear a much greater
proportion of the costs of local government than existing
homeowners with similar homes. 205 Indeed, the petitioner in the
case, who purchased her home in 1988, alleged that she paid five
times more in property taxes than her neighbors, who had owned
comparable houses in the same neighborhood since 1975. 206 As the
only basis for this disparity was the date of home purchase, the
petitioner claimed that the initiative arbitrarily distinguished
between newer and existing residents in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.207
The Court held, however, that there was a reasonable basis for
this distinction—reliance interests. As the Court stated:
[A]n existing owner rationally may be thought to have vested
expectations in his property or home that are more deserving of
satisfy the pent-up demand for housing by leap-frogging existing suburban communities for
pristine exurban greenfields. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1133–41 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, The Local
Government Boundary Problem]. I focus my attention here on interlocal segregation because I think
it is sufficient to make the point that courts’ solicitude for reliance interests is misplaced.
204. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
205. See id. at 6.
206. See id. at 6–7.
207. See id.

1012

DO NOT DELETE

949

1/27/2014 10:26 AM

Reliance in Land Use Law
protection than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at the
point of purchase. A new owner has full information about the
scope of future tax liability before acquiring the property, and if he
thinks the future tax burden is too demanding, he can decide not to
complete the purchase at all. By contrast, the existing owner,
already saddled with his purchase, does not have the option of
deciding not to buy his home if taxes become prohibitively high. 208

The Court’s reasoning directly reflects the Tieboutian logic of the
public choice model. According to that model, as we have seen,
those who have no reliance interests in a particular parcel retain the
freedom to “vote with their feet” and choose where to locate,
whereas those who have established reliance interests face much
higher exit costs and are thus essentially stuck with the regulatory
policies of their existing jurisdiction. Accordingly, policymakers may
legitimately favor the latter as against the former.
While Nordlinger dealt with the property tax, its logic makes
practically unassailable any municipal policy that favors existing
residents at the expense of prospective residents. It is commonplace
for municipalities to protect homeowners’ reliance interests by
placing drastic restrictions on new housing, which will necessarily
make housing for prospective residents either unavailable or
extremely expensive.209 Homeowners are particularly adverse to new
multi-family or affordable housing because of the anticipated
impacts of such housing on property values and property taxes. 210
Zoning laws that restrict the availability of affordable housing are
often referred to as “exclusionary zoning” laws because their impact,
if not their intent, is to exclude those in need of affordable
211
Under Nordlinger’s logic, however, exclusionary zoning
housing.
policies are immune from assault because prospective residents can
presumably locate elsewhere if the costs of entrance to a particular
208. Id. at 12–13.
209. See sources cited supra notes 8, 202.
210. See Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 203, at 1133–41
(discussing political economy that causes suburban municipalities to exclude undesirable uses
like affordable housing); Schragger, supra note 202, at 1834–52 (2003) (critiquing political
economy of the suburbs in which homeowners have incentives to exclude undesirable uses such
as affordable housing).
211. The literature on exclusionary zoning is voluminous, but for excellent short
discussions, see Schragger, supra note 202; J. Peter Byrne, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 Geo.
L. J. 2265 (2000).
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municipality are too high, whereas existing homeowners are already
locked into their investment.
There is reason to doubt Nordlinger’s presumption, however.
Most metropolitan regions today feature dozens of suburban
communities that all maintain substantially similar exclusionary
zoning regimes; the cumulative effect is a pattern of de facto
segregation in which small, affluent, largely white suburbs are able
to maintain their exclusivity with zoning barriers, while the poor,
often minority individuals excluded thereby are shepherded into
deteriorating urban ghettos. 212 The reality of ghettoization belies the
premise of the public choice model that prospective suburban
residents have the ability to vote with their feet: inner-city residents
have no effective ability to exit because the surrounding suburban
communities have all erected fairly uniform zoning barriers against
entry.
Nevertheless, even in cases where the severe class and racial
impacts of exclusionary zoning practices have been evident, the
reliance interests of existing homeowners have provided a sturdy
defense for such practices. An exemplar of this trend is Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 213 one of
the rare cases in which the Supreme Court has considered the
constitutionality of a suburban exclusionary zoning ordinance. In
this case, the village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, a suburb of
Chicago, was zoned almost entirely for single-family homes. Census
reports revealed that of 64,000 residents of the village, only twentyseven were black. A developer proposed to build low-income
housing on a parcel of land in a neighborhood zoned exclusively for
single-family homes, and therefore requested that the parcel be
rezoned from a single-family residential classification to multi-family
residential. The city council refused to authorize the rezoning, after a
series of public meetings at which city residents expressed their
opposition to the project. According to the Court, opponents of the
project argued that “the area always had been zoned single-family,
and the neighboring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance
212. See generally MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 1–78 (1976) (on the
relationship between suburban zoning and urban ghettoization); Schragger, supra note 202, at
1838 (“The current extreme segregation of American metropolitan regions owes a great deal to
the power of localities to restrict in-migrants based on income.”).
213. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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on that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable
drop in property value for neighboring sites.” 214 The Court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the village’s refusal to rezone
was the result of intentional discrimination (required to establish a
Fourteenth Amendment violation) because “[t]here is no reason to
doubt that there has been reliance by some neighboring property
owners on the maintenance of single-family zoning in the
vicinity.” 215 Arlington Heights, like Nordlinger, thus stands for the
proposition that the protection of reliance interests is a perfectly
reasonable basis for favoring existing residents at the expense of
non-residents, even where the result is a massively disproportionate
impact on racial minorities.
Although the sanctification of reliance interests in Nordlinger and
Arlington Heights is superficially consistent with the public choice
model, these decisions are also troubling from the public choice
perspective because they seem rather insensitive to the plight of
“discrete and insular minorities.” As we have seen, one of the central
concerns of the public choice model is to protect the interests of
isolated minorities who may be subject to exploitation by
majoritarian factions. Fischel, for example, argues that developers
should be considered the equivalent of a discrete and insular
minority because, given the dominance of homeowners in the local
political process and their antipathy toward new development,
developers are unlikely to be influential with municipal
authorities.216 By this logic, the primarily low-income minority
populations that are consigned to living in poorer central cities by
zoning decisions such as the one validated in Arlington Heights are the
quintessential discrete and insular minorities. While homevoters are
often opposed to all new development, they are most adamantly
opposed to new affordable housing, which promises not only to
dramatically increase the overall housing supply and thus lower
property values, but also to increase the demand for additional
municipal services, which will ultimately require higher property
taxes. 217 At the same time, the poor, primarily minority individuals
214. Id. at 258.
215. Id. at 270.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 151–60.
217. See Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 203, at 1133–41
(discussing political economy that causes suburban municipalities to exclude undesirable uses
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who desire to live in suburban municipalities are the classic
politically isolated “outsiders” who, not being residents of the
communities in which they seek to live, have no voting power
there—indeed, the very gravamen of the complaint in Arlington
Heights is that the plaintiffs were excluded from living in the village.
Yet, cases like Arlington Heights and public choice theorists like
Fischel appear untroubled by the exclusion of minorities from
suburban communities. 218
The Court and the public choice theorists have managed to avoid
confronting this dilemma with a simple but revealing logic: they
treat each municipality as a fully self-contained entity that has no
impacts outside its own borders. As the effects of local land use
policy are, by assumption, totally encapsulated within the
municipality itself, the local political process simply need not
concern itself with the interests of prospective residents, who can
easily choose to locate in a neighboring jurisdiction if they dislike
one community’s policies.
The Court’s decision in Arlington Heights, for example,
conceptualizes the village as if it were an isolated island rather than a
tiny fragment of a large metropolitan region. The opinion trains its
focus on a single zoning decision by this lone municipality—the
village’s refusal to rezone a parcel of land to enable a developer to
build low-income housing—and, finding nothing amiss with that
isolated zoning decision, holds that there is no constitutional
problem. Absent from the decision is any of the broader context in
which the rezoning decision took place, such as the village’s longstanding pattern of exclusionary zoning that resulted in the village
being almost entirely devoid of minorities, or the fact that the sort of
exclusionary zoning practices challenged in the case were so
widespread in the Chicago area and throughout the country as to
create a nationwide pattern of interlocal segregation. 219
like affordable housing); Schragger, supra note 202, at 1834–52 (critiquing political economy of
the suburbs in which homeowners have incentives to exclude undesirable uses such as
affordable housing).
218. Rick Schragger’s incisive critique of Fischel’s THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS notes:
“[T]he book’s most glaring omission is any sustained treatment of race as a component of the
homevoter’s political economy.” Schragger, supra note 202, at 1836.
219. Arlington Heights’ polar opposite in this regard is Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary impact of suburban zoning ordinances on minorities was sufficient to
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In other decisions, the Court has more explicitly considered local
governments to be autonomous entities whose decisions have no
impacts beyond their borders. In Warth v. Seldin, 220 an important
precursor case to Arlington Heights, a group of plaintiffs identifying
themselves as residents or taxpayers of the city of Rochester, New
York, challenged the assertedly exclusionary zoning practices of a
neighboring suburban community called Penfield. They claimed that
Penfield’s zoning practices directly affected them insofar as
Rochester was forced to absorb the need for affordable housing that
Penfield refused to accommodate at considerable cost to Rochester’s
own taxpayers. The Court found, however, that the causal link
between high taxes in Rochester and Penfield’s zoning practices was
too speculative. “Whatever may occur in Penfield, the injury
complained of—increases in taxation—results only from decisions
made by the appropriate Rochester authorities, who are not parties
to this case.” 221 Likewise, in Milliken v. Bradley,222 the Court held
that a district court had exceeded its equitable powers in crafting a
remedy for racial segregation in the Detroit public school system by
requiring Detroit’s predominantly white suburbs to participate in a
desegregation plan for the metropolitan area as a whole. The Court
held that the suburbs bore no responsibility for the predominantly
black population of the Detroit public school system, which was
instead the product of “unknown and perhaps unknowable factors
such as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative
acts of private racial fears.” 223

establish a violation of New Jersey’s equal protection clause, without regard to discriminatory
intent. The court noted that Mount Laurel’s zoning practices were emblematic of the practices in
suburban communities throughout New Jersey, which in combination had led to the decline of
core urban areas. See id. at 717, 723–24.
220. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
221. Id. at 509.
222. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
223. Id. at 756 n.2. One notable exception to the Supreme Court’s general trend of seeing
local governments as autonomous entities is Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69–
70 (1978), in which the Court frankly acknowledged that one municipality’s actions may have
innumerable impacts on individuals outside the municipality’s borders. Ironically, however, the
Court reasoned from this premise that states could legitimately limit the franchise to municipal
residents because it would be administratively impractical to extend the vote to all those affected
by municipal decision making. See id. Interestingly, the state courts have by and large been much
more willing than the federal courts to hold local governments accountable for the
extraterritorial impacts of their land use regulations. In Part III.A.3, I explained that several state
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2. The public choice model’s fatal flaw
The Court’s reluctance to recognize that one municipality’s
actions can have influence beyond its borders is not simply a
Pollyannaish reaction to the realities of segregation; rather, the
fiction that the impacts of local land use policies are wholly
contained within municipal borders is necessary to sustain the entire
public choice model. The model presupposes that municipalities can
reliably use their land use powers to protect homeowners’ reliance
interests in pre-existing property values by, for example, excluding
new development that may diminish property values. If in reality,
however, one community could easily externalize the impacts of its
land use practices onto neighboring communities, that
presupposition would be completely undermined. 224 For example, if
a municipality approved the siting of a malodorous landfill right near
the border of an adjacent town so that the offensive smells from the
landfill would principally afflict homeowners on the other side of the
border in the adjacent town, then whatever land use policies the
latter community adopted to protect the property values of those
unfortunate homeowners would be fruitless. This problem is
especially likely to appear where there are numerous small
communities in close proximity to one another, each of which is free
to adopt land use policies to protect its own homeowners without
regard to the impact of its policies on neighboring towns. Thus, a
critical, albeit unstated premise of the public choice model is that
such external impacts simply do not exist.225
courts have permitted homeowners to sue neighboring towns whose land use decisions affect
their property values. In some cases, notably New Jersey, this recognition of the broad impacts
of municipal land use regulation subsequently led the courts to question exclusionary zoning
practices. See Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 727 (invalidating exclusionary zoning law based on
regional impact and citing an earlier decision, Borough of Creskill v. Borough of Dumont, 104 A.2d
441, 445–46 (N.J. 1954), which held that homeowners have standing to challenge zoning
decisions by neighboring towns). For the most part, though, state courts have not followed the
decisions regarding standing to sue to their logical conclusion and invalidated exclusionary
zoning laws.
224. See Schragger, supra note 202, at 1831 (local government’s ability to safeguard
property values may be undermined if there are significant “regional or interlocal spillover
effects”).
225. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 969 (1991) (noting that the Tiebout
model assumes externalities do not exist); Schragger, supra note 202, at 1831 (“Fischel has no
place in his political economy for interlocal or regional effects.”).
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There is reason, though, to doubt this premise. As Richard
Schragger has pointed out in an incisive critique of Fischel, the
relationship between local government policies and home values is
not nearly as robust as Fischel claims, largely because home values
are not entirely determined by local land use decisions but are heavily
affected by a wide variety of factors outside of local control,
including land use siting decisions by neighboring communities and
macroeconomic trends such as the state of the national real estate
market. 226 The recent real estate downturn should be sufficient to
prove that point—the collapse of risky assets in which major Wall
Street banks had heavily invested led to a loss of liquidity and
consumer confidence in the real estate markets that then caused a
sharp decline in property values across the nation. 227 Local zoning
practices could mount little defense against this powerful,
destructive force. In short, the entire judicial enterprise to protect
homeowner reliance interests by empowering small suburbs to
control their own land use is largely ineffectual because localities
have only a weak ability to prop up property values.
CONCLUSION
If the public choice model is to be believed, we should expect
Americans by and large to be thrilled with their local governments.
Under this model, as we have seen, the vast majority of local
governments are small suburban communities in which
homeowners—the primary constituency—are able to use their ample
political influence to ensure that their property values are protected
through restrictive zoning ordinances. Who would be unhappy with
a government that gives the people exactly what they want? Yet,
according to the Saint Index study mentioned in the Introduction,
more and more Americans are becoming dissatisfied with their local
governments’ land use policies. 228 This suggests that local
226. Schragger, supra note 202, at 1830–31(“The existence of externalities means that the
quality or availability of ‘local’ amenities is often beyond the control of a specific local
government or the homeowners who vote within it.”).
227. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J.
1177, 1181–85 (2011).
228. See The Saint Consulting Group, supra note 2 (stating that fifty-one percent of
respondents rate local government as “fair to poor” on zoning and planning, and sixty-four
percent believe land-use approval process is “unfairly” skewed in favor of developers).
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governments are not giving the people what they want. The real
estate collapse has made it increasingly obvious that local
governments cannot cure the inherent volatility of real estate prices,
and it is this disconnect between the promise of local governments
to protect homeowners’ property values and their evident inability to
do so that likely explains homeowner dissatisfaction with local
governments.
As we have seen, policymakers and courts have long
romanticized zoning for stabilizing property values so that
individuals could purchase homes and acquire a “stake” in the affairs
of government. Judged by the levels of homeownership in this
country and the high degree of political activism by homeowners in
local government, zoning has been a great success. However, it
should also now be clear that homeowners’ “stake” in local politics
is quite a mixed blessing. It has led, on one hand, to a political
system in which it is nearly impossible to reverse the devastating
impacts of interlocal segregation, and, on the other, to increasing
cynicism about local government even among its supposed
beneficiaries. All this has been the price for making homeowners’
reliance interests our highest priority, and yet, as just mentioned, it
is hardly evident that the existing political system does a particularly
good job at protecting those reliance interests. This impoverished
model of local government is unworthy of the judicial favor it has so
long received.
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